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The Evolution of NATO with Four Plausible Threat Scenarios

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THE EVOLUTION OF NATO
WITH FOUR PLAUSIBLE
THREAT SCENARIOS

by

JEAN EDWARD SMITH
STEVEN L. CANBY

DND CANADA

An Extra-Mural Paper presents the view of its author on a topic of potential interest to DND. Publication by ORAE confirms the interest but does not necessarily imply endorsement of the paper's content or agreement with its conclusions. It is issued for information purposes and to stimulate discussion.

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ABSTRACT

NATO is not sui generis. Its roots trace to an informal Western alliance that dates from the early 1900's. The geographic, political, economic, cultural, and ethnic ties that bind the countries of the northern Atlantic are ineluctable. Accordingly, the Alliance is unlikely to disappear or disintegrate. Part I of this study analyses the historic antecedents of NATO. Part II postulates four possible military threats that confront the Alliance in Europe today: a surprise attack; a pre-emptive non-surprise attack; a full-mobilization offensive; and a limited attack against an isolated NATO component.

RESUME

L'O.T.A.N. n'est pas sui generis. Ses racines remontent jusqu'à une alliance informelle des pouvoirs occidentaux du début de notre siècle. Les liens géographiques, politiques, économiques, culturels et ethniques qui lient les pays de l'Atlantique du nord sont inéluctables. Par conséquent, sa disparition ou sa disintégration sont peu concevables. La première partie de cette étude fait une analyse des origines de l'O.T.A.N. La deuxième partie trace quatre menaces possibles face à l'alliance en Europe d'aujourd'hui: une attaque par surprise; une attaque préemptive mais attendue; une offensive de grand envergure, en pleine mobilisation; et une attaque limitée contre une partie isolée constituante de l'O.T.A.N.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFNORTH	Allied Forces, Northern Europe
AFV	Armoured Fighting Vehicle
ATGM	Anti-tank guided missile
C ³	Command, control and communications
CDI	Conventional Defence Initiative
CF	Covering Force
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GSFG	Soviet Forces in East Germany
LOC	Lines of communication
MBT	Main battle tank
MRL	Multiple rocket launcher
NSWP	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces
OB	Order of battle
OM	Operational methods
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
<u>Stavka</u>	Soviet Military High Command

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NATO has been studied to death. If scholars and defence professionals writing about the Alliance had been fractionally correct, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would have collapsed many years ago. But the fact is, most analyses of NATO focus on the ephemeral. The threat of novel weapons systems, transitory troop deployments, and elusive spending ratios have become the warp-and-woof of contemporary analysis. This study differs fundamentally. It looks at NATO in long-term perspective, and argues two basic themes. First, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is merely the contemporary manifestation of an informal western alliance that dates from the turn of the century. Second, that that alliance, profiting from the lesson of two world wars, has been remarkably successful in preventing a third. The conclusion that flows from this is that NATO is unlikely to disappear or disintegrate. Like all successful alliances, it will occasionally suffer setbacks. But the geographic, political, economic, cultural and ethnic ties that bind the countries of the northern Atlantic are ineluctable. Leaders come and go; issues wax and wane; even constitutions and forms of government change. But the linkage of a common heritage endures.

Part I of the study analyses the historic antecedents of NATO: the Anglo-American rapprochement in the 1890's; the British-French diplomatic and military accords prior to World War I; Britain's ambiguous attitude toward Germany; the interwar collaboration between the Third Republic in France and the Weimar Republic in Germany; the re-emergence of alliance solidarity in postwar Europe; and the continuous strength of NATO in a bi-polar world.

Part II postulates four plausible military threat scenarios that confront the Alliance in Europe today: a surprise attack, a pre-emptive non-surprise attack; a full-mobilization offensive; and a limited attack against an isolated NATO component. It argues that Europe remains the world's political and military centre of gravity, and that NATO's strategy must be framed to apply maximum force at the right place at the right time.

THE ALLIANCE IN PERSPECTIVE

The general staffs prepared war plans of increasing complexity and talked gravely of the conflict that would break out, 'when the snow melted on the Balkan mountains'. Navies were built and rebuilt; millions of men were trained for war. Nothing happened. Each year the snows melted; spring turned into summer, summer into autumn; and new snow fell.

A. J. P. Taylor
Struggle for the Mastery of Europe

1. NATO has been studied to death.¹ If scholars and defence professionals writing about the Alliance had been fractionally correct, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would have collapsed many years ago. But the fact is, most analyses of NATO focus on the ephemeral. The threat of novel weapons systems,² transitory troop deployments,³ and elusive spending ratios⁴ have become the warp-and-woof of contemporary analysis. This study differs fundamentally. It looks at NATO in long-term perspective, and argues two basic theses. First, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is merely the contemporary manifestation of an informal western alliance that dates from the turn of the century. Second, that that alliance, profiting from the lesson of two world wars, has been remarkably successful in preventing a third. The conclusion that flows from this is that NATO is unlikely to disappear or disintegrate. Like all successful alliances, it will occasionally suffer setbacks. But the geographic, political, economic, cultural and ethnic ties that bind the countries of the northern Atlantic are ineluctable. Leaders come and go; issues wax and wane; even constitutions and forms of government change. But the linkage of a common heritage endures.

THE U.S.-BRITISH ALLIANCE

2. Although the Atlantic is scarcely an English sea, it has been dominated by the two great English-speaking nations for the last two hundred years. Divided throughout the 19th century by competing territorial claims, political antagonisms and commercial rivalries, the United States and Great Britain drew close to one another at the century's close. In retrospect, that rapprochement marked a singular departure from the traditional policies of both countries -- countries that had fought two major wars with one another, and narrowly averted a third during a period of intense hostility in the 1870's.

3. For Great Britain, an aloofness from entangling alliances had been as central to England's foreign policy as the admonitions of Washington's Farewell Address had been for the United States.⁵ But by 1900, with the United States rapidly coming of age as a world power, both countries shucked aside their previous reluctance and, led by an extraordinary shift in public opinion, began a collaboration that has continued virtually uninterrupted to the present day.⁶

4. The turn-of-the-century British view was best summarized by Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain in a speech in Birmingham, May 13, 1898 -- shortly after Admiral Dewey had destroyed the Spanish fleet in the battle of Manila Bay. According to Chamberlain, the closer the co-operation between Britain and the United States, "the better it will be for both and for the world." Chamberlain said the next task for Britain was:

... to establish and maintain bonds of amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic [loud cheers].... They speak our language, they are bred of our race. Their laws, their literature, their standpoint on every question are the same as ours; their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world, are identical with ours. And I even go so far to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together [loud and prolonged cheers] over an Anglo-Saxon alliance.

5. Although no formal alliance was forthcoming, Chamberlain's views were cordially reciprocated by John Hay, then American ambassador to the Court of St. James, and soon to become U.S. Secretary of State. In Hay's view, "a sanction like that of religion" bound the two English-speaking countries in a "sacred mission of liberty and progress."⁸

6. The sudden reversal in American and British outlook had many causes. Undoubtedly, the firm support offered by Great Britain to the United States during its war with Spain was among the most significant.⁹ While the monarchies of continental Europe had tilted toward Queen Maria Christina, England -- the only country that could have intervened decisively -- backed American efforts to liberate Spain's overseas colonies. Most Britons, as the English journalist Sidney Low observed, forgot past antagonisms and derived "satisfaction in the gallantry and success of another branch of the Anglo-Saxon race at a time when all races seemed likely to be tested in the crucible of world politics."¹⁰ It is clear that the common heritage -- the shared language, the similar culture, and the tradition of the common law -- helped create a new bond of understanding between the United States and Great Britain.¹¹

7. In addition, by 1900 commercial rivalry had yielded to trading partnership. Great Britain was by far the leading purchaser of American products, as well as the chief supplier of U.S. imports and capital. A large community of businessmen and financiers moved back and forth between the two countries, and were at home in both. Their fortunes depended on the Atlantic economic connection and therefore on good Anglo-American relations. Such men enjoyed public esteem; governments heeded their counsel. As economic ties deepened, so did British-American friendship.¹²

8. There were political changes as well. The evolution of British political institutions, and especially the widening of the franchise by electoral reform, had by 1898 greatly altered the British social structure. And if a more democratic Britain had a greater appeal for the ordinary American, the United States no longer seemed like a rabble-rousing republic to upper-class Britons. America's written Constitution and the conservative influence of the Supreme Court made the U.S. appear as a welcome bastion of stability in an increasingly turbulent world. In fact, the upper classes of the two countries co-mingled increasingly. The Duke of Marlborough, Lord Curzon, Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Playfair, Sir William Harcourt, leader of the Liberal party, and Lord Randolph Churchill, all men of considerable influence in Britain, were married to Americans.

9. But important as the ties of blood, heritage and trade undoubtedly were, it was also true that the two countries had no clashing vital interests. In fact, each recognized the need for an ally to counterbalance an increasingly assertive continent. Russia

threatened British interests in both the Far East and in the Near East, while German industrial strength and naval power had grown enormously. The U.S. was also apprehensive about Russia and Germany. Czarist expansion in the Far East could jeopardize potential Asian markets, while German activity in Latin America threatened the Monroe Doctrine and the potential isthmian canal. This growing commonality of outlook led Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to note that "the downfall of the British Empire is something which no rational American could regard as anything but a misfortune for the United States."¹³

10. The rapprochement of 1898 blossomed during the early years of the 20th century. Adoption of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1900 paved the way for the construction of the Panama Canal (incidentally permitting the United States to double its Atlantic fleet in case of war in Europe), while the settlement of the Alaska-Canada boundary dispute by arbitration in 1903 resolved the last serious territorial issue between the two countries.¹⁴

11. By 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt could write to John St. Loe Strachey, editor of the Spectator, that "I regard all danger of any trouble between the United States and Great Britain as over I think forever."¹⁵

12. With America's entry into World War I, rapprochement yielded to alliance. The common victory, though not achieved without friction, cemented the bonds of kinship further. The ease with which Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill worked together during World War II -- from the Atlantic Charter until FDR's untimely death in 1945 -- illustrates further that the ties of a common language,

heritage and political tradition transcend national boundaries. Thus, after Roosevelt's death and Churchill's electoral defeat, Anglo-American relations remained on a steady course. Whether it was Truman and Atlee; Acheson and Bevin; or Eisenhower and Macmillan, the United States and Great Britain continued to share a common purpose and a common outlook.

13. The current tie between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, regardless of their ideological affinity, reflects that fundamental unity of purpose. It was no surprise when the United States vigorously supported British efforts to regain the Falklands.¹⁶ It was no surprise when Mrs. Thatcher permitted U.S. planes based in the United Kingdom to join in the raid on Tripoli. And it is certainly no surprise that both the President and Prime Minister speak the same shorthand of political accommodation as did Roosevelt and Churchill, or for that matter, Hay and Chamberlain. As will their successors.

II.

THE ROLE OF FRANCE

14. Franco-British relations have witnessed a similar sea-change. The restoration of the Bourbon dynasty and the accord reached at the Congress of Vienna helped heal the wounds opened by the Napoleonic wars. Similarly, the defeat of the Second Empire by Bismarck's Prussia in 1871 not only removed an imperial rival in Napoleon III, but set the stage for a renewed period of Anglo-French co-operation. In fact, there are remarkable parallels in the fall of the two

Napoleons.

15. The inception of the Third Republic (following France's defeat by Prussia) found French prestige at its lowest point since 1815. On the Continent, republican France was without friends or allies; overseas, France enjoyed only scattered remnants of a once-great empire. By 1914, the contrast was striking. France had become the keystone of a Western alliance and possessed the world's second largest colonial empire. There is special irony in this because few Frenchmen had any real interest in foreign policy in those years. It was not an issue in electoral campaigns; the National Assembly rarely debated international problems, and cabinets almost never fell on questions of foreign policy. The attention of most Frenchmen was fixed on domestic matters: the church-state conflict or the Dreyfus affair. This widespread indifference to foreign policy gave an almost free hand to those few politicians and interest groups that looked beyond France's frontiers. That, too, was similar to the period following the Congress of Vienna and helps explain the relatively free hand enjoyed more recently by Presidents of the Fifth Republic.

16. French policy throughout the period 1871-1914 has often been described as dominated by a single passion: the determination to recover Alsace-Lorraine. French diplomacy, according to this view, was simply the story of a slow, steady, single-minded effort to break out of the isolation imposed by Bismarck and to encircle Germany for the final reckoning by force. But the story of French foreign policy was far more complicated. France's feud with Germany over Alsace and Lorraine was not the only issue of importance, or even the central

issue of that era. The legend nevertheless contains a kernel of truth. For the fact is that Alsace-Lorraine was the only important issue that never disappeared from 1871 to 1914. It persisted as an irritant, but not the cardinal point on the diplomatic compass. It affected policy, but was not the key to an understanding of all French attitudes and actions. If most Frenchmen never really forgave the Germans after 1871, the idea of revanche had clearly lost most of its appeal by the 1890's. Indeed, alongside the resentment and bitterness, there was a strong desire for a reconciliation with Germany. Schemes for economic collaboration -- notably the development of Franco-German banking consortia for joint investment in Africa became especially popular. And French Socialists, inspired by the size and apparent power of German socialism (the SPD was the largest party in the Reichstag) eagerly anticipated the friendly co-existence of several proletarian states in western Europe. If their hopes for reconciliation failed, that failure resulted more from the erratic policies of post-Bismarckian Germany than from the persistence of any irreconcilable anti-German feeling in France.

17. For the first twenty years after 1871 French diplomatic isolation remained complete. While both Thiers and Gambetta, the leading figures of the Third Republic, hoped for an eventual understanding with either Great Britain or Russia, no good opportunity for such a rapprochement occurred. The price of an entente with Russia would have been a French promise to support the Russians in their conflicts with Britain in the Middle East; the price for an entente with the British would have been the reverse. In both cases the risks seemed to outweigh possible French gains. Domestically, France was also

divided. The monarchist Right tilted toward Russia; the republican Left toward Great Britain.

18. For a brief period in the 1880's Gambetta and Gladstone forged what has become known as the Liberal Alliance, linking Britain and France by the common sentiment that their colonial differences should be settled by negotiations, not war. But in 1882, an almost accidental dispute over Egypt ruptured that alliance, and destroyed for almost a generation the possibility of a formal Anglo-French accord.¹⁷

19. But it was Egypt that eventually brought England and France together. The ill-fated Fashoda expedition of Captain Marchant in 1898 (in which France sought to contest British supremacy on the upper Nile) caused the French government to reconsider its policy of challenging British suzerainty in Egypt, while the exchange of state visits between Edward VII and French President Loubet in 1903 did much to re-kindle public affection between the two countries. King Edward, in particular, excited the French imagination. In his contact with French statesmen, Edward made clear his desire for an understanding between France and Great Britain, and the Royal endorsement of republican France helped immeasurably to clear the air between the two countries.

20. French Foreign Minister Delcassé, who accompanied President Loubet to London, told the British government that "he was entirely in favour of a comprehensive settlement, and that the Egyptian question formed part of the larger African question which could, he felt sure, be disposed of satisfactorily if only we could come to an

agreement as to the position of France and Morocco."¹⁸ And the British government, as Balfour advised Edward VII, were "unanimous in their wish to proceed with negotiations" on the basis outlined by Delcassé.¹⁹

21. The desire for reconciliation was not entirely spontaneous. Great Britain's near-defeat in the Boer War combined with Germany's increasing alignment with Britain's foes caused the British government to reflect on her traditional role as holder of the European balance. An agreement with France -- with whom Britain had no major differences -- would provide a vital counter to German ambitions, and give the British an important continental partner. For France, an alignment with Great Britain would likewise reduce the threat from Germany flowing from the capricious policies of William II, while providing valuable naval support for the far-flung French empire. In addition, French statesmen such as Delcassé saw the opportunity to achieve a modus vivendi with Britain in the Mediterranean: Britain's control of Egypt would be recognized in return for French control of Morocco. French public opinion would be appeased and the unfortunate legacy of 1882 would be laid to rest.²⁰

22. On April 8, 1904, Great Britain and France concluded what has since become known as the Entente Cordial. The two countries recognized the respective claims of each to Egypt and Morocco, and reached a comprehensive settlement of lingering disputes in West Africa, Thailand, Madagascar, Newfoundland, and the New Hebrides. The Newfoundland dispute, for example, dated to the early eighteenth century.

23. An equally decisive threshold was crossed on January 31, 1906, when British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey authorized the commencement of military conversations between the British and French general staffs. It was commonly believed at that time that the decisive battles of the next war would be fought within the first month. Therefore, Great Britain could help France only if plans were already prepared. In Grey's words:

We must be free to go to the help of France as well as free to stand aside.... If there were no military plans made beforehand, we should be unable to come to the assistance of France in time.²¹

24. The formation of the Entente Cordial, plus the establishment of general staff planning, bound Britain and France to oppose German aggression. But it also linked the two most liberal states of Europe -- republican France and parliamentary England -- in ways more fundamental. Since the time of the great French philosopher Montesquieu,²² British political ideals had inspired many in France, and despite the rivalries of the Napoleonic period, both countries shared a common outlook about the dignity of man, the rights of the individual, and the rule of law. These common linkages, as opposed to the tradition of absolutism still dominant in central and eastern Europe, facilitated the ease with which French and British governments collaborated, and helped lay the foundation for the co-operation that has continued throughout the 20th century. The accession of Czarist Russia to the entente was based exclusively on Anglo-French apprehension about Germany, and Russian fears of Austro-Hungarian hegemony in the Balkans. As Grey noted in 1906, "an entente between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to

check Germany, it could then be done."²³ In 1907 it was fear of a united Germany that brought the allies together; in 1987 it is apprehension about a divided Germany in the context of Soviet imperialism that cements the Alliance.

25. But there was no lingering hostility toward Germany in 1907. Rather, it was a question of German unpredictability, aided and abetted by a constitutional system that left full authority in foreign affairs to the Emperor.²⁴ As Sir Eyre Crowe, Grey's principal assistant in the Foreign Office, wrote on New Year's Day 1907, the problems with Germany were less a result of German design "than the expression of a vague, confused, and impractical statesmanship, not fully recognizing its own drift."

A charitable critic might add...that the well-known qualities of mind and temperament distinguishing...the present ruler of Germany may not improbably be largely responsible for the erratic, domineering, and often frankly aggressive spirit which is recognizable at present in every branch of German public life....

Earl Grey appended his own comment to Crowe's note that "the restless and uncertain personal character of the Emperor William" had to be taken into account. "There was at least method in Prince Bismarck's madness," said Grey. "But the Emperor is like a cat in a cupboard. He may jump out anywhere."²⁵

26. The Franco-British entente survived the First World War, somewhat the worse for wear. Throughout the interwar period, French foreign policy pursued a solitary aim: security. That security, as always, had a double focus: the alliance with Great Britain and the problem of Germany. And just as between 1871 and 1914, the average

Frenchman sought neither revenge nor hegemony over Germany, but accommodation. The problem was how to achieve it. At the peace conference, Clemenceau had abandoned France's demand for control of the Rhine in return for an American and British promise of aid should France be attacked. When the U.S. Senate repudiated the American guarantee, the British government withdrew its offer as well. But for France the Atlantic tie remained vital. In retrospect, the failure of the Allies to continue their wartime collaboration constituted a fatal error. The recognition of that error, and the determination not to repeat it, represents the keystone of the Atlantic Alliance.

27. As for Germany, post-war French policy was divided. In January 1923, the Poincaré government occupied the Ruhr to force German compliance with the reparation provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The move proved to be a disaster. British and American opinion was outraged at France's unilateral action; the Germans were bitter; and the fact is that French reparations' collections for 1923 did not significantly exceed those for 1922. Indeed, the cost of collecting them was higher than the value of the goods. In 1924 Poincaré was defeated and Aristide Briand, an apostle of friendship with Germany, returned as foreign minister. France's resolve had been mortally wounded. Never again during the Third and Fourth Republics would a French government act independently without British support.

28. Under Briand, France sought to heal the wounds with Germany.²⁶ Briand remained foreign minister virtually without interruption from 1925 to 1932. Never since Delcassé had there been such continuity at

the foreign office. And the policy of Briand, reflected in such efforts at accommodation with Germany as the Locarno Treaty of 1925,²⁷ the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928,²⁸ and nascent proposals for a "United States of Europe", marked a renewed spirit of Atlantic cooperation. In this context, the anti-German policy of Poincaré was an anomaly; the Europeanist view of Briand -- which embraced the democratic, peaceful and prosperous Germany of the Weimar republic during the late Twenties -- was more typical of French opinion. In Briand's words at Locarno:

Peace for Germany and for France: that means that we have done with the long series of terrible and sanguinary conflicts which have stained the pages of history. We have done with black veils of mourning for sufferings that can never be appeased, done with war, done with brutal and bloody methods of settling our disputes

29. Briand's view was reciprocated by Gustav Stresemann, Germany's chancellor (1923) and foreign minister (1924-29), who led the Weimar Republic back into the concert of Europe and an unprecedented period of prosperity. Stresemann's untimely death in 1929 interrupted the growing Franco-German reconciliation, for no one of Stresemann's stature appeared on the German scene to continue his work. And the reluctance of France in 1930 to aid the Brüning Government in grappling with the onset of economic crisis in Germany helped foreclose that brief era of republican rapprochement. When agreement was reached at Lausanne in June 1932 to cancel further German reparations payments, it was too late to save the Weimar regime.

30. Aside from the internal problems of the Weimar Republic, it was the failure to integrate Germany into the democratic West that most

facilitated Hitler's rise to power. The outcast, neutralized, and de-militarized status thrust on Germany after World War I provided a fertile setting for pan-German paranoia. Isolated and alone, German resentment fed on itself. In this context, Hitler's strident nationalism appealed to a population that considered itself (wrongly) forsaken. The treatment accorded the Federal Republic after 1949, and the ascension of West Germany to NATO in 1955, contrasts markedly. Instead of being left to her own devices, the FRG has been bound tightly to the West. And the success of the present formula, unlike that after World War I, is patently apparent. If French occupation policy in 1945 failed to perceive that,²⁹ it was subsequently appreciated by De Gaulle. And the Franco-German accord over which he and Chancellor Adenauer presided remains an integral part of the Atlantic solidarity that has evolved.

NATO IN THE CONTEXT OF POSTWAR EUROPE

31. The World War II peace settlement, from which the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact have evolved, was as accidental as the peace of Versailles was deliberate. The paradox of the present division of Europe (and Germany) is that no one planned it. Yet perhaps because it was not planned; perhaps because it naturally developed to accommodate the underlying realities of power and ideology, it has proved remarkably stable and resilient.

32. In 1919, the victorious Allied statesmen, dominated by Wilsonian righteousness, sought to achieve a peace based on "justice", self-determination, and the international equality of all states -- big

and small alike. Armaments were controlled, Germany was neutralized, the Austro-Hungarian empire dismembered, and the war guilt (along with an open-ended reparations debt) placed squarely on the Central Powers. Rationality and good will, it was argued, had supplanted realpolitik. The world, in Wilson's words, had been made safe for democracy.

33. The Utopian dream of 1919 survived less than twenty years. By September 1, 1939, Europe was again at war. And the causes of that war, precipitated unambiguously by German aggression, trace directly to the refusal of Allied statesmen at Versailles, St. Germain, and Trianon to recognize the imperatives of power that stemmed from Germany's defeat. The vacuum in the heart of Europe created by the demilitarization of the Central Powers provided an opportunity for irredentist sentiment to fester. The exclusion of Germany and Russia from the peace settlement not only denied that settlement legitimacy, it left outside the European consensus the two nations with the wherewithal to overturn it. And by leaving Germany embittered but united, with no stake in preserving the status quo, the Versailles Treaty sprouted the seeds of its own undoing.

34. By contrast, after Germany's defeat in 1945 the victorious powers quickly fell to quarrelling among themselves. Early plans framed at Potsdam for treating Germany as an economic unit disintegrated in the face of French refusal to establish all-German administrative machinery to implement those plans. Confronted with French intransigence, each of the four military zones of occupation was increasingly thrown upon its own devices. Co-ordinated, quadripar-

tite government became a goal impossible to achieve. And as East-West relations deteriorated throughout 1946 and 1947, Germany became the focus of cold war tension. The Soviets had not torpedoed a common policy toward Germany. That initial distinction lay with the French. But in the atmosphere of great power hostility that engulfed Germany by late 1947, it became abundantly clear that an agreed peace settlement with a united Germany was beyond reach.

35. Instead, each zone evolved independently. In 1947, the U.S. and British zones were joined (Bizonia) for economic purposes, and in early 1948 the London Conference of six western European nations (Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg) called for the formation of a German government, freely elected and reflecting the will of the German people. Since it was clear that such a government would not be possible in the Soviet occupation zone, the Western powers were, in effect, calling for Germany's division. And while Soviet policy still favoured a united Germany -- communism was running at flood tide in Europe -- the United States, Britain and France moved decisively in the Spring of 1948 to dismember Germany. The three Western zones of occupation became the basis of a non-Communist West German state that would provide a bulwark against further Soviet expansion.

36. The American Marshall Plan, the Soviet coup in Prague, and the clarion call of the London Conference for a West German government must be seen as incremental responses to the basic hostility that had developed between East and West. None had a precipitating effect, but each reflected the growing international discord.

37. In June 1948, Western military authority announced a currency reform for the U.S., British, and French occupation zones, in effect splitting Germany into two economic units: in the West, the basic currency became the newly introduced Deutschemmark while in the Soviet zone the old Reichsmark (soon to become the Ostmark) continued to circulate. For trade and commercial purposes, Germany was now divided.

38. The Soviets responded immediately by closing their zonal boundary to all Western traffic. The Berlin blockade had begun! But perhaps more importantly, the zonal boundary between the Soviet zone, and the U.S. and British zones (the French and Soviet zones were not contiguous), ceased its role as a temporary demarcation line separating military forces in the quadripartite occupation of Germany, and began its evolution into a state frontier. Indeed, into the Great Divide between East and West. None of this had been planned. But the severing of ties between the Soviet and Western zones reflected the political reality of 1948. Just as the Triple Entente had emerged to confront German bellicosity, a re-newed Western Alliance coalesced to contain Communist expansion.

39. The strategic balance at that time deserves review. Europe had been devastated by the war, and was not yet on its feet. Capital was in short supply; economic recovery lagged; commerce and transportation were disrupted; while unemployment remained at catastrophic levels. The entire agricultural sector lay in shambles, and food shortages were rampant. Vigorous Communist parties had emerged in France and Italy. The strong Marxist tradition in Germany had survived the

Hitler period unscathed, and Eastern Europe already had slid into the Soviet orbit.

40. At the military level, a large Soviet force remained in Germany, supported by even larger Russian formations in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, and the western reaches of the U.S.S.R. The American and British armies had been largely demobilized (the U.S., for example, had more troops in Germany in 1920 than it did in 1948), and the Western occupation forces were designed primarily for constabulary functions rather than tactical operations. To be sure, the United States retained a nuclear monopoly, but it was scarcely a deterrent to political unrest.

41. Seen in this context, the Berlin blockade could be considered a Soviet gambit to force the Western forces from Berlin: a preliminary step to establishing a Communist Germany. Western withdrawal from Berlin would have induced a panic flight to communism for safety, and that flight would have engulfed France and Italy as well. A second explanation suggests that Soviet purposes were more limited: namely, to forestall formation of a West German government by holding Berlin as hostage. A third view suggests that the blockade reflected a Soviet attempt to consolidate their position in eastern Germany, and Berlin within it. But given the military and political momentum of 1948, that explanation remains the least likely.

42. Regardless of its motivation, the blockade not only failed to drive the Allies from Berlin, it galvanized Western resistance. The Berlin Airlift, launched in desperate response, solidified Western resolve. An aroused public opinion in western Europe, Germany and

the United States joined spontaneously to block Communist aggression. The heroic efforts of allied airmen to supply the isolated city, combined with the steadfast determination of the Berliners to endure whatever hardships were necessary, marked a crucial turning point in world politics. No single event since World War II has had a more lasting effect. For in a fundamental sense, the blockade and the airlift marked the end of the wartime alliance. The Soviets -- and their East German allies, confronted the Western powers -- and their West German allies. The victors and vanquished from World War II became partners and allies on different sides of a new ideological divide.

43. In an equally important sense the Berlin airlift reversed the political momentum in Europe. The bleak winter of 1948-49 -- with the issue in Berlin very much in doubt -- represented the high-water mark of Communist expansion. When the weather broke that spring, so too did Soviet resolve. And the determined stand that had brought the West together paved the way for the formal linkage of the Atlantic Alliance: a ratification of international reality.

44. Within Germany itself, the German political leaders of the three western zones had completed their work for a new constitution [Basic Law]: a constitution which they grudgingly conceded would create a divided Germany. Here again, the outcome had not been planned. The Federal Republic of Germany emerged as a political response to Communist expansion. Unlike 1919, no one suggested that a divided Germany reflected a "just" peace. Yet by the same token, it clearly corresponded to the political, military, and ideological situation.

45. The current division of Europe traces to the division of Germany in 1948-49. The establishment of the Federal Republic created a formidable bulwark against Communist expansion. The zonal border closure of June 1948, the currency reform that preceded it, and the subsequent division of Germany into the political entities, provide the framework for the peace settlement that has evolved. And while it may not be ideal, it has proven to be exceptionally enduring.

46. The roots of the present stability lie in the accommodation of political systems to objective reality. In 1919, Wilsonian idealism dictated a peace settlement that bore little relation to the forces that beset Europe. In 1949, the settlement that emerged corresponded directly to those forces: it was forged in a crucible of struggle, and represented the equilibrium that resulted. Unlike 1919, all parties had a stake in preserving that equilibrium. And also unlike 1919, none of the major players had been excluded.

47. Above all, a defeated Germany had not been left isolated, neutralized, and embittered. The German people may have been bewildered initially, but they were not sullen and resentful. With few exceptions, they did not harbor the spirit of revenge that overturned Versailles. No power vacuum emerged. And Germans on each side of the border were quickly integrated into the competing alliance systems of East and West. And as new political forms took root, the two Germanies became major participants in their respective alliances.

48. Also, unlike 1919, there were no borders left in doubt after 1949. Whereas Germany's eastern frontier remained in flux during the early Twenties, the boundary between East and West was rigidly

defined. That precise demarcation has been a major contribution to stability. From the Baltic to Trieste (to use Churchill's phrase), the respective spheres of control have acquired the sharp definition of common usage. And even Berlin, where quadripartite control legally continues, the rights of the respective powers have been carefully delineated and adhered to.

49. The Atlantic Alliance is an integral part of this evolutionary (and extraordinary) peace settlement. Arising out of a felt need to contain Communist expansion, the Alliance provides the continuing political and military linkage that manifests Western resolve. In that sense, it is an organic development rather than an artificial construct -- the natural culmination of a Western heritage that seeks to preserve peace, stability, and the international status quo. It is a natural growth, not a hot-house transplant. It reflects the nurturing of circumstance, not design. And its resiliency rests on the fact that it conforms to the expectations not only of its members, but of its opponents as well. The same, of course, could be said for the Warsaw Pact.

THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF THE NATO ALLIANCE

50. The ingredients of post-war European stability are straightforward: precise demarcation of respective boundaries; bipolar predictability; mutual deterrence; the lack of undefined territorial alignment in which a power vacuum could promote adventurism; and a tacit (sometimes explicit) agreement among all parties that the present evolutionary settlement is preferable to the uncertainty that would

flow from any attempt to overturn it.

51. The Berlin Accords of 1971 provide the best explicit example of the preference of all parties to maintain the status-quo. Under those Agreements, the victors of World War II acknowledged the continuing right of both East and West to interpret their respective roles in Berlin differently. The United States, Britain, and France maintained that Berlin should continue under four-power occupation. The Soviets agreed. The Soviet Union maintained that East Berlin (the Soviet sector) is the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The western powers did not disagree. All agreed on the continuing right of free access between West Berlin and the Federal Republic (for which the Soviets assumed responsibility), just as all agreed that West Berlin was not de jure a part of the FRG. Such pragmatism -- such willingness to legitimize present arrangements, regardless of how "illogical" they may appear to outside observers -- belies predictions of impending catastrophe. Indeed, the Berlin Accords, in the context of German history, offer tangible proof that a balance of competing military forces is more likely to provide stability than the absence of such forces. Curious as it may seem, the world is a safer place with the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union in Berlin rather than out of it. That, at least, is the lesson of the last forty-two years.

52. Relations between the two Germanies reflect a similar accommodation. Following the Berlin Accords, the two nations exchanged diplomatic representatives, were admitted to the United Nations, and implicitly accepted one another as essential to the peace of Europe.

The frontier between the two is still the "inter-German" border; bilateral trade remains "inter-German" trade (and is not subject to tariffs or duties); and there continue to be West German constitutional impediments to full diplomatic recognition. But it is another example of the efficacy of counter-vailing power. The so-called inter-German border, perhaps the most heavily guarded boundary in the world, marks the precise demarcation between East and West. And while lyricists may wax eloquent about its inhumanity, the fact is that in a larger sense it has ensured European peace and stability since 1949.

53. Military confrontation, in other words, is not necessarily detrimental to peace and stability, providing both sides remain in substantial balance, and the risks of conflict are patent and unacceptable. The precise demarcation that exists between East and West would not have proved so effective, had it not reflected the balance of military power in the post-war world. And since that balance is essentially bi-polar, it does not require sophisticated leadership to maintain it. With five (and sometimes more) participants, the concert of Europe required a Bismarck or Disraeli to orchestrate it. With only two players, the permutations became manageable for statesmen of ordinary abilities. And because of the relatively simple bilateral equation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact have demonstrated far more stability than the alliance structures both during the Nineteenth century, and the inter-war period. Alliances are a product of insecurity. In a multi-polar world, the sources of insecurity are varied; hence it is not surprising to find alliances shifting to accommodate these variations. But

a bi-polar world produces refreshing clarity. The threat is unambiguous.

54. It likewise seems inescapable that the advent of nuclear weapons, and the mutual deterrence that has resulted, has induced exceptional caution on both sides. Unlike their predecessors, the post-war leaders of East and West have been exceedingly reluctant to risk war with one another. The possibility of any sustained crisis escalating to nuclear war has helped the superpowers restrain adventurous junior partners. The Berlin situation again provides a good example. The nuclear confrontation between U.S. and Soviet forces is less likely to produce a low-level conflict that might escalate than the direct confrontation of East and West German forces, where the possible gains might be perceived to outweigh the non-nuclear risks. In this context, the development of nuclear weapons has had a stabilizing effect in post-war Europe. Indeed, technological innovation is not always a threat to the balance of power if its benefits and dangers are distributed equally. As Nikita Khrushchev observed, "The atomic bomb does not observe the class principle."³⁰

55. Finally, the division of Europe between East and West has left no unoccupied territory that might invite adventurism. The armed neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland is not only predicated on the present division of Europe, but is sufficiently intimidating to deter reckless attack. Austria and Finland reflect bi-polar tradeoffs; their status in the shadow of the respective alliances is secure. If there is a problem, it remains (as usual) in the Balkans. Yugoslavia is no more reliable to the Soviet Union than Greece to the United

States. But defection, in each instance, would not materially affect either alliance.

56. In conclusion, the evolutionary peace settlement of World War II seems unlikely to come unravelled. Regardless of its injustices and seeming anomalies, it conforms to the fundamental power relationships that have dominated post-war Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an integral component of that relationship. And in an equally fundamental sense, NATO is merely the contemporary manifestation of an enduring Western collaboration that began at the turn of the century. That collaboration is unlikely to disappear.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Edwina S. Campbell, Consultation and Consensus in NATO (New York: University Press of America, 1985); M. Chinchester, "Britain and NATO: The Case for Revision," World Today, 415-21 (November 1982); Elliot A. Cohen, "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," 61 Foreign Affairs 325-43 (Winter 1982-83); Norman C. Dodd, "NATO in Disarray," 111 Army Quarterly 288-97 (July 1981); Stephen J. Flanagan and Fen Osler Hampson, Securing Europe's Future: Changing Elements in European Security (Dover Ma.: Auburn House, 1986); Andre G. Frank, "From Atlantic Alliance to Pan-European Entente," 8 Alternatives 423-82 (Spring, 1983); Walter F. Hahn, "Does NATO Have a Future?," 5 International Security 151-72 (Summer 1980); David K. Hall, "Economic Stress in the NATO Alliance," American Enterprise Institute Foreign Policy and Defence Review (1982); J. D. Hessman, "NATO Overview: New Challenges Facing the Alliance," Atlantic Community Quarterly 42-51 (Spring, 1980); Stanley Hoffmann, "New Varieties on Themes," 4 International Security 88-107 (Summer 1979); Sir Geoffrey Howe, "The European Pillar," 63 Foreign Affairs 330-43 (Winter 1984-85); Karl Kaiser, "NATO Strategy Toward the End of the Century," 37 Naval War College Review 69-82 (Jan.-Feb. 1984); Mary Kwak, "Ostpolitik and the Atlantic Alliance," 7 Harvard International Review 35-7 (Sept.-Oct. 1984); Walter Laquer and Robert Hunter (eds.), European Peace Movements and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Transaction Books, 1985); Kenneth A. Meyers (ed.), NATO: The Next 30 Years (Croom-Helm, 1980); Roger Morgan and Stefan O. Silvestri (eds.), Moderates and Conservatives in Western Europe: Political Parties, The European Community and the Atlantic Alliance (London: Heinemann, 1982); Earl C. Ravenal, "Europe Without America: The Erosion of NATO," 63 Foreign Affairs 1020-35 (Summer, 1985); Rudolf Steinke and Michael Vale (eds.), Germany Debates Defense: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads (Sharpe, 1983); R. W. Tucker and Linda Wrigley (eds.), The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics (New York: Praeger, 1983); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, NATO and Western Security in the 1980's (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980); U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Crisis in the Atlantic Alliance: Origins and Implications (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982); Patrick Wall, "Advice to the Alliance -- How to Strengthen NATO's Unity and Effectiveness," 28 Sea Power 108 (April 1985).
2. McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Reliance," 60 Foreign Affairs 753-68 (Spring, 1982); Fredrich Bonmart, "Follow-on Forces Attack," 29 NATO's Sixteen Nations 49 (Nov.-Dec. 1984); Harold Feiveson and John Duffield, "Stopping Sea-Based Counterforce," 9 International Security 187 (1984); Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980); Alton Frye, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: No Exit from Ambivalence," 22 Survival 98-106 (May/June 1980); David Garnham, "Extending Deterrence with German Nuclear Weapons," 10 International Security 96 (1985); Patrick J. Garrity, "Why We Need

Nuclear Weapons," Policy Review 36 (Winter 1985); John J. Mershheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," 9 International Security 19-46 (Winter 1984-85); William K. Megill, "The Deployment of Pershing II to Europe - Some Implications," 60 Military Review 58-66 (November 1980); Andrew Pierre, "The Conventional Defense of Europe; New Technologies and New Tactics," Council on Foreign Relations, Project on European-American Relations, 1985; George M. Seignious II, and Jonathan Paul Yates, "Europe's Nuclear Superpowers," Foreign Policy 40-53 (Summer 1984); Gene Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable (Hagerstown, Md.: Ballinger, 1986); David Paul Yost, "European Anxieties About Ballistic Missile Defence," 7 Washington Quarterly 112 (1984).

3. Sir Hugh Beach, "The Role of Conventional Forces in the Defence of Europe," Council on Foreign Relations, Project on European-American Relations (August, 1985); K. G. Benz, "Fire and Maneuver: The German Armored Corps and Combined-Arms Operations," 17 International Defense Review 473 (1984); Andreas von Bulow, "The Future of NATO's Conventional Defense in Europe," Council on Foreign Relations, Project on European-American Relations (Sept. 1985); Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, "[FOFA] Strategy for Victory or Defeat?," 66 Air Force Magazine 80 (April 1983); Group Captain Timothy Garden, "Strengthening Conventional Deterrence: Bright Idea or Dangerous Illusion?," 129 Journal for Defense Studies 32 (1984); Andrew Hamilton, "Redressing the Conventional Balance: NATO's Reserve Military Manpower," 10 International Security 111 (1985); Francois Heisbourg, "Conventional Weapons Defence in Europe," Council on Foreign Relations, Project on European-American Relations (August 1985); Joseph Joffe, "Should NATO Go Conventional," 7 Washington Quarterly 136 (1984); Robert B. Kilbrew, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options (Wilmington, De.: Scholarly Resources, 1986); Jeffrey Record, Force Reductions in Europe: Starting Over (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980); R. B. Remnek, "A Possible Fallback Counteroffensive Option in a European War," 35 Air University Review 52 (Nov./Dec. 1983); General Bernard W. Rogers, "Greater Flexibility for NATO's Flexible Response," 11 Strategic Review 11 (Spring 1983); Milton G. Weiner, "Distributed Area Defense," Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1986.
4. Karen L. Busler, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Three Percent Commitment," Congressional Reference Service, Library of Congress, April 20, 1985; James A. Golden, NATO Burden Sharing: Risks and Opportunities (New York: Praeger, 1983); David Greenwood, "NATO's Three Per-cent Solution," 23 Survival (Nov./Dec. 1981); Robert W. Komer, "A Credible Conventional Option: Can NATO Afford It?," 12 Strategic Review 33 (Spring, 1984); Alice C. Maroni and John J. Ulrich, "The U.S. Commitment to Europe's Defense: A Review of Cost Issues and Estimates," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, November 7, 1985; Eric T. Olson, "NATO Burdensharing: A New Look Needed," 63 Military Review 12 (Nov. 1983).

5. "It is our true policy," said Washington, "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.... It must be unwise for us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of [Europe's] politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities." For text, see Felix Gilbert, To The Farewell Address (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), Appendix, p. 145.
6. There were, of course, earlier attempts at rapprochement. President Lincoln, in the last state paper written by him before his assassination, advised the British minister in Washington that "The interest of civilization and humanity require that the two Nations should be friends. I have always known and accepted it as a fact that the Queen of England is a sincere and honest well-wisher of the United States; and have been equally frank and explicit in the opinion that the friendship of the United States toward Great Britain is enjoined by all the considerations of interest and of sentiment affecting the character of both."

More to the point were the comments of General Grant, contained in the concluding passages of his remarkable Memoirs: "England and the United States are natural allies and should be the best of friends. They speak one language and are related by blood and other ties. We together, or either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world." Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, vol. 2 (New York: Charles L. Webster Co., 1886), p. 549.

7. London Times, May 14, 1898.
8. John Hay, Addresses of John Hay (New York: Scribners, 1906), pp.78-79.
9. It was widely believed that Captain Edward Chinchester of the Royal Navy placed his squadron between Admiral Dewey and a menacing German flotilla at Manila Bay, pre-empting potential German intervention on Spain's behalf. Cf. Thomas A. Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," 45 American Historical Review 59-81 (1939).
10. Sidney Low, "The Change in English Sentiment Toward the United States," 26 Forum 369-370 (1898).
11. According to U.S. Secretary of State Richard Olney, because of "the close community...in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals -- in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by both; the two countries would stand side-by-side whenever danger threatened". Richard Olney, "International Isolation of the United States", 81 Atlantic Monthly 580 (1898).
12. Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 202.

13. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, Feb. 2, 1900. Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 (New York: Harper, 1925), vol. 1, p. 446.
14. With the Alaska boundary dispute settled, other irritants such as the North Atlantic fisheries dispute, Bering Sea fur seals, and the Panama Canal were ultimately settled to both parties' satisfaction.
15. Roosevelt to Strachey, September 11, 1905, quoted in Edna Strachey, St. Loe Strachey: His Life and His Paper (London, 1930), p. 182.
16. One hundred and fifty years earlier President Monroe had supported Britain against the Republic of Buenos Aires in a similar confrontation over the Falklands. See Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company, 13 Peters (38 U.S.) 415 (1834). For more recent analysis, see Hedley Bull and Wm. Rogers Lewis, eds., The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'special relationship'?" America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War," International Affairs 1-20 (1986). For a more specialized study that makes the same point, see Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Tie that Binds: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UK-USA Countries (Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1986).
17. The most bizarre aspect of the 1882 Egyptian affair was that the British landed in Egypt at the suggestion of French Premier Gambetta, and that Gambetta's purpose had been to use joint intervention in Egypt as a first step toward creating an Anglo-French entente. But Gambetta fell from office before the Assembly could vote funds for French participation, and thus France did not join in the landing. The sole British nature of the enterprise soured French public opinion toward England for the next twenty years.
18. As quoted in Neville Waites, Troubled Neighbour: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971), p. 20.
19. Ibid.
20. French President Loubet was a devoted admirer of Delcassé, whom he regarded as "a second Richelieu."
21. Earl Grey, Twenty-Five Years, vol. 1, p. 75 (1925). Grey neglected to inform the cabinet of the talks. After consulting Edward VII, Grey and Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman decided that it would be best to keep the conversation discreet, rather than alarm the radicals in the cabinet. See Paul Cambon to Rouvier, 31 July, 1906, Documents diplomatiques français, second series, ix(i), p. 106.

22. Baron Montesquieu's classic of self-government, The Spirit of the Laws (1748), was patterned on the British parliamentary system.
23. Gooch and Temperly, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. VII, p. 376.
24. According to Article Eleven of the Constitution of the German Empire (1871), "The Emperor shall represent the Empire in the Law of Nations, declare war and conclude peace in the name of the Empire, enter into alliances and other treaties with foreign states, and accredit and receive ambassadors."
25. Gooch and Temperly, op. cit.
26. It was Briand, for example, who first used the word apaisement in relation to Germany.
27. Under Article 1 of the Locarno Treaty (the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee) Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy guaranteed the inviolability of the German frontier with Belgium and France, together with the demilitarization of German territory fifty kilometers east of the Rhine. In Article 2, Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France, mutually agreed not to attack, invade, or resort to war against each other.
28. The Kellogg-Briand Pact (the Pact of Paris, August 27, 1928), signed by fifteen countries including the United States, condemned "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."
29. See especially F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany: 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
30. As cited in William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p.5.

THE THREAT SCENARIOS:

HOW NATO WOULD RESPOND TO FOUR WARSAW PACT ATTACKS

1. This chapter provides an analysis of four threat scenarios stemming from potential military action by Warsaw Pact forces against the Alliance. It posits the fact that Europe remains the world's center of gravity: economically, militarily, and politically. Since the time of Charlemagne, whoever dominated central Europe dominated the world. That has not changed. Accordingly, NATO's military strategy must be framed to apply maximum force at the right place at the right time. As Winston Churchill noted, "if we win the big battle in the decisive theatre, we can put everything else straight afterwards." ¹ And that means a decisive presence on the Central Front.

2. NATO does not always observe this principle. As Clausewitz warned, it attempts to defend everything, and in the process is too weak everywhere to defend anything. Many of its members have no meaningful military role. Too often the attempt to show resolve draws off resources needed at the focal point. In some cases both NATO and the individual country would be better off if the latter were outside the Alliance rather than in it. For example, both NATO and Sweden are better off with present arrangements. NATO benefits from Sweden's armed neutrality, while Sweden (with its defence premised on NATO's existence) has fashioned a military structure capable of independent protective action.

3. NATO's flanks illustrate the point even more clearly. The Northern Flank assumes its importance mainly as a bulwark against a Soviet

threat to the sea link between Europe and North America. Roughly a quarter of NATO's military budgets are allocated to the Northern Flank. Nevertheless, the North is not well defended and continues to be particularly vulnerable to a coup de main. In fact, the use of tailored air forces would be far more effective for northern defence than the present reliance on expensive land and naval forces. And if the resources presently diverted to the North were redeployed in central Europe, conventional balance would be achieved in Germany, thus reducing the importance of sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the first place.

4. Similarly, the Southern Flank is not crucial to the defence of Europe. Oil tankers traverse the Cape, not the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean (as Churchill belatedly discovered after Gallipoli) is primarily of political rather than military importance. Blocking the Dardanelles is important, but not overwhelmingly so. And it can be done by many means.

5. Because of NATO's weakness at the center of gravity, "coupling" Europe's defence with "first use" of the American nuclear deterrent has dominated Alliance strategy for thirty-five years. More recently, with the loss of unambiguous U.S. nuclear superiority, a divisiveness has entered NATO discussions. On the one hand, there has been a clamour for tangible proof of American resolve, while on the other, a rise of pacifism in some European countries has been all too apparent. In the United States, successive administrations have wandered from fecklessness to recklessness. Indeed, it is U.S. inability to implement its declared "first use" doctrine that underlies

the need for the Strategic Defense Initiative.

6. Conversely, if the major powers of Western Europe would resume their traditional military readiness; that, combined with the peacetime presence in Europe of substantial North American conventional forces, would reduce the demands for extended deterrence and there would be no need for early reinforcement from the United States and Canada (and expensive SLOC defence). The requirement for in-place forces, and their immediate fleshing, provides the best guarantee of effective deterrence while simultaneously protecting Europe from surprise attack. The savings of such a strategy are significant with a conventional balance in central Europe, there would no longer be a need for large contingency forces. Such forces would still be needed, but their quantity would be less important than their quality. Thus, a conventional balance in Europe, for the countries of North America, is cheaper than the present state of inferiority which depends upon timely and expensive reinforcement for success.

7. More importantly, perhaps, a strategy of conventional balance in central Europe would eliminate the divisive issue of American "first use" of nuclear weapons that is presently required to offset conventional weakness. No one questions the credibility of American "second use". Strong conventional forces in place in Central Europe coupled in this manner to U.S. strategic forces would strengthen deterrence. They would not undercut it. Indeed, conventional balance in central Europe would shift the burden of reaction and escalation to the Russians across the spectrum of possible scenarios.

FOUR CONTINGENCY SCENARIOS

8. Scenarios are frequently used to define the political context and dynamics of possible conflicts and to scale military requirements in time and size. Political scenarios are by nature open-ended; certainly the richness of human events rejects precise prediction. It is possible, however, to focus on the major underlying factors which govern events, and thus gain a better appreciation of how unfolding confrontations might be anticipated and affected, if not controlled.

9. Scaling scenarios, on the other hand, are inherently finite and fully calculable since they are generally based on indices of the respective capabilities involved. These scenarios have the character of testing exercises; they are governed by predetermined criteria (whose own value as indicators is a matter of contention) and the purpose is to define force-availabilities and response times. Such scenarios serve to justify (and assess) the size of basic forces as well as mobilization and reinforcement plans. As such, scaling scenarios are essentially mechanical exercises, driven by relative capability indices and formal assumption as to procedures and doctrines.

10. Contingency scenarios are speculative. These scenarios form the basis of theories on how an opponent might operate, and therefore serve as introspective devices for analyzing one's own deficiencies, and for adjusting to the unexpected. It is this third (and largely ignored) category of contingency scenarios that is addressed in this chapter. As opposed to the "bookkeeping" approach inherent in scaling scenarios, this "net assessment" scenario goes beyond numerical

indicators to examine qualitative factors, with the objective of assessing the consequences of unexpected dispositions, operations, and tactics, as well as the interplay of the fundamentally different styles of warfare of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

11. It could be argued that this third category is moot since NATO should not worry about fine-tuning its response to the Warsaw Pact threat when it is still unable to cope even with the most straightforward use of Pact capabilities. However, even those who hold such a pessimistic view must concede that if NATO is to rely on nuclear deterrence (given an inadequate defence), it must still maintain a sufficient coherence in its command structure and military deployment to hold out until nuclear weapons are used and their impact felt. In any case, NATO forces are not small. By some measurements, they are actually larger than the opposing Pact forces. It is therefore possible that new life could be infused into the military structure of the Alliance by addressing the implications of operations by Pact forces.

12. There are, moreover, optimists who contend that NATO's forces can in fact cope with the Pact threat especially upon completion of NATO's Long Term Defence Program. For those who hold that view, the contingency planning examined in this chapter assumes a more positive value. If NATO's forces were adequate by all conventional indices, military history is replete with examples of supposedly superior forces being defeated by supposedly weaker enemies though the use of stratagems, deceptions, and surprise. What accentuates the importance of the issues raised here is the fact that the "optimists" must

hinge their case on exceedingly fragile assumptions. These assumptions generally rest on firepower-based capability estimates, and notably on high estimates of the defensive value of precision-guided munitions (PGMs). This implies a static and purely tactical view of warfare, whereas the scenarios presented in this chapter treat warfare at the operational level, where it becomes a cognitive game in which any putative solution begets a response which then calls for counter-action. In this context, maneuver as well as attrition is included in the analysis instead of the unbalanced focus on attrition alone, which characterizes the tactical indices now in general use.

13. The four contingency scenarios developed in this chapter proceed from (i) plausible political circumstances; (ii) the Soviet procedure for generating combat forces out of the peacetime structure; (iii) the modes of Soviet battle deployment within the European theater; (iv) the operational Soviet method of warfare; and (v) the collision between Soviet action and the NATO structure. The emphasis here is on the operational aspects of phases iii - v. The four scenarios are diverse in both political and military terms:

- (a) an out-of-the-blue surprise attack;
- (b) a pre-emptive, non-surprise attack;
- (c) a full-mobilization offensive;
- (d) a limited attack against an isolated NATO component,
i.e. - with the U.S. expelled from Europe.

14. All the scenarios presented are plausible. All credit the USSR with a certain degree of political and military restraint, if only to reduce the possibility of nuclear escalation, and to unravel the

Alliance by appealing to its diverse national interests. In each case, however, (in accordance with the stated Soviet preference) the Warsaw Pact strikes first and with as much surprise and momentum as it can muster. And in each case, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces induce a collapse of the NATO defences in a few days, more because of NATO errors of structure and conduct than because of Soviet military prowess.

THE BASE CASE: THE ORDER OF BATTLE AND THE MILITARY BALANCE

15. The Bookkeeping: The NATO and Warsaw Pact Order of Battle Estimates, and the time-phasing of reinforcements are supposedly² well-known, and are displayed in Figures 1 and 2.

FIGURE 1
CENTRAL EUROPEAN REINFORCEMENT SCHEDULE³ (IN DIVISION-EQUIVALENTS)

Nationality	MDay	+2 ^e	+4	+6	+8	+10	+12	+14	+16	+18	+20	+22	+24	+26	+28	+30	Totals
WARSAW PACT																	
Soviet	22 1/3 ^b	11	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	71 1/3
East German	6 ^b																6
Czech	4 1/3 ^b	2	1	1	1				1								10 1/3
Polish	5	5	3	3		2		2				2					14
Hungarian	4	4					1		1								6
Increment	32 2/3	22	6	6	3	4	3	4	4	3	3	5	3	3	3	3	
Cumulative Total	32 2/3	54 2/3	60 2/3	66 2/3	69 2/3	73 2/3	76 2/3	80 2/3	84 2/3	87 2/3	90 2/3	95 2/3	98 2/3	101 2/3	104 2/3	107 2/3	107 2/3
NATO																	
American	6 ^c	-	1	1	1	1	1		1/3		1/3		1/3		1/3	1 1/3	13 2/3
West German	12	-	2	9	1	1											16
British	3 1/3 ^{c,f}	-				2/3				1/3		1/3					4 2/3
Belgian	1 ^d	-	1										1/3				1 1/3
Dutch	1/3	-	1	2/3	1/3	1/3	1/3										3 1/3
Canadian	1/3	-															1/3
French	1 1/3 ^d	-	4	1						1/2					1/2		7 1/3
Increment	24 1/3	0	9 2/3	3 1/3	2 1/3	2	1 1/3	0	1/3	5/6	1/3	2/3	1/3		5/6	2	
Cumulative Total	24 1/3	24 1/3	34	37 1/3	39 2/3	41 2/3	43	43	43 1/3	44 1/6	44 1/2	45 1/2	45 1/2	45 1/2	46 1/3	48 1/3	48 1/3
Divisional Equivalence Ratio, Warsaw Pact/NATO	1.3	2.25	1.8	1.8	1.75	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.25	2.25	2.25	

a. Assumes uninterrupted mobilization by both sides.

b. Warsaw Pact totals for MDay include divisions positioned in the GDR and Bohemia.


c. American, British, and French MDay totals allow 1/3 division each for the respective Berlin garrisons.

d. Due to their modified TOEs British 'divisions' = 2/3 division; British Field Forces = 1/3 division; Belgian 'divisions' = 2/3 division; French 'divisions' = 1/2 division.

e. NATO starts to mobilize two days after the Warsaw Pact.

f. Ten battalions (all arms) of the BAOR are normally detailed to Northern Ireland, with arrangements for rapid return.

g. Territorial Army brigades.




The Warsaw Pact begins with an initial force ratio advantage of 1.3:1, with that ratio temporarily increasing to 2.25 by Mobilization Day (M) plus 2 and thereafter generally staying at a level of 2:1 up through M+30. The Warsaw Pact is generally conceded a two or three day head-start in mobilization. This adds to its force-ratio advantage; but more important, this head-start can be converted by the Pact into an advantage in readiness and in force-positioning. These can be powerful "force multipliers" in a surprise context. Specifically, with its advantages in overall force, readiness and initial positioning, the Warsaw Pact could launch overwhelming attacks in specified sectors. This could mean that NATO would be unable to recover its balance, or use tactical nuclear weapons except as a political act to indicate resolve (and this may not have much substantive content at that point).

16. The NATO Plan: For historical, political, and military reasons, NATO forces are organized into national corps sectors (the so-called NATO 'layer-cake'), as shown in Map 1. Peacetime locations are shown in Map 2. Each corps deploys its forces according to general NATO guidelines but these guidelines are implemented in a distinctly national manner.³ These guidelines call for strong covering forces for the main battle positions which are located well forward, near the inter-German border. The missions of the covering forces are to delay; to inflict attrition, and to discern the main attack. Most of the Corps' forces have been deployed on-line. There are few reserves, except in the case of I and II German corps.

M A P 1

Corps Sectors of Military Responsibility in NATO's Central Region



SOURCE: Adapted from Richard Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, *U.S. Force Structure in NATO* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 31 and also from U.S. Army materials.

a/ NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) and CENTAG (Central Army Group) are the two subdivisions of NATO forces in West Germany. The line dividing the two runs from Belgium through West Germany, just south of Bonn, and into East Germany.

17. It can be argued that this deployment is optimal from both the American (military), and the European (political) point of view. The deployment is certainly in accord with American Army doctrine, as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5. Linear deployments (with most of the forces on-line) maximize the amount of firepower that can be brought to bear and therefore score optimally according to the evaluative models now in vogue in the U.S. Such a firepower orientation obviously offers great scope to the emerging new technology of sensors, data-processing facilities, and above all PGMs. As for the air force, its planning and coordination are greatly simplified by a linear deployment, so that a higher (and more cost-effective) sortie rate can be generated, thus enhancing the apparent usefulness of tactical air power.

18. At the same time, a linear strategy is fully congruent with the European perspective on NATO, which is frankly political. In the European view, the NATO Alliance is not for war-fighting but rather for deterrence. Even conservative elements (e.g., French Gaullists and German Christian Democrats) simply do not believe that the Soviet Union would launch an all-out aggression against the West. They see the Soviet aim as political. Specifically, to intimidate Western Europe to obtain compliance with Soviet desiderata. A cordon defence, in conjunction with (American) nuclear capabilities, can thus accomplish the European purpose in NATO very well. In Clausewitz's words:

The intent of a cordon ... is to withstand a slight attack - slight either because the attacker is easily discouraged [i.e. deterred] or because the attacking force is small [i.e., because of the fear of initiating a nuclear response].⁴

Clausewitz notes that a cordon defence can ensure:


...the preservation and security of the country [i.e. forward defence and deterrence] against an enemy who is not intent on major action. [i.e., "Finlandization", rather than all out aggression.]⁵

19. In the European view, the layering of the national corps sectors emphasizes the resolve of the Alliance as a whole, while it amounts to a structural device which ensures that each member nation will sustain its share of the common burden. In principle, it offers a cheap budgetary strategy, for the main burden of security is shifted from expensive European conventional forces to relatively cheap nuclear weapons, deployed by a non-European power. In addition, it shifts the main burden to demonstrative action from the European partners to the wielder of the ultimate sanction, and for the West Germans in particular, a cordon should cope with limited incursions into their territory during crisis periods, while it should also be able to hold the enemy in a targetable form while the decision to use nuclear weapons is made.





20. The Warsaw Pact Plan. The peacetime deployments of the Group Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) is shown in Map 2 as 20. The GSFG must be the cutting edge of any Warsaw Pact offensive, whether it is "out-of-the blue" or fully reinforced. Should war occur, it is widely assumed that Soviet forces would attack across the front in order to pin down the NATO forces while the main weight of the offensive would be concentrated in echelons aimed at narrow sectors to achieve breakthroughs and to carry out the subsequent exploitation at rates of advance of 60-100 kms per day. The main attack corridors

and their topographical features are shown in Map 3. The conventional view is that the Soviet offensive would be massive and heavy-handed, displaying little flexibility overall.



21. Soviet air forces have shifted in recent years from a decided emphasis on air defence to a more offensive mode, as manifest in their imposing ground air defence system and in their new longer-legged, greater payload aircraft now entering the inventory (Figure 3). At the beginning of a war, it is again widely believed that Soviet air forces will mount an independent air offensive, with the aim of destroying and disrupting NATO air capabilities, overall command and control, and nuclear weapons.⁶ Thereafter, Soviet tactical air power would shift to the support of ground forces advancing along the breakthrough axes, with an emphasis upon targets beyond the reach of artillery.⁷



**Warsaw Pact
Aircraft Ranges^a**

-  Short Legged (< 1000 km)
-  Medium Legged (1000-1400 km)
-  Intermediate Legged (1400-2000 km)
-  Long Legged (> 2000 km)

a. The declining numbers of Intermediate range WP aircraft is a function of the retirement of large numbers of obsolescent aircraft, such as the IL-28, with that range.

- b.  French
-  Dual-based American

sources: The Military Balance 1960, 1969-1970, 1979-1980; and William Green and Gordon Swanborough, The Observer's Soviet Aircraft Dictionary (Observer's Pocket Set, 1970).

THE SCENARIOS

Scenario One: The Disintegrative Effects of U.S. Decoupling in the Context of Deteriorating East-West Relations: A Soviet Out-of-the-Blue Surprise Attack
The Land Attack Deception Plan:

22. Strategic arms negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. break down acrimoniously. The Americans begin SDI deployment. The Soviets increase their warheads on large missiles. To outside observers, it becomes apparent that SDI and missile field defence do not translate into implementing extended deterrence. Meanwhile, a White House scandal raises questions of competence and credibility. To deflect criticism, the Administration revives its Human Rights campaign against the Soviet Union.

23. The Germans become unnerved by the conjunction of U.S. weakness and provocation. In its attempt to continue the Ostpolitik, or at least preserve its benefits for inter-German relations, the FRG government seeks an accommodation with the Russians. This leads to a direct policy conflict with the U.S., and polarizes the German electorate. A "right-wing" Chancellor emerges when the CDU-CSU win the elections. Doubts as to the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella are now openly expressed in Bonn. A year after the election, Soviet Intelligence informs the Politburo that the FRG has embarked on a crash program to develop nuclear weapons, and that the inventive Germans have found a short-cut to an ABM capability based on beam weapons. The Politburo releases the data: it announces to the world that the FRG is developing nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons to wage aggressive war. The German Chancellor denies all,

which is entirely peaceful in intent. Left-wing demands for a special investigation are rejected by the government on the grounds that the IAEA already inspects all FRG nuclear facilities, and that proprietary industrial data is involved.


24. Independently, and prior to these developments, the Politburo had become alarmed for the long-term security of the Soviet state, because of its declining rate of economic growth, its demographic problems, and the projected rise of Chinese and Japanese military power that threaten Siberian security. At the same time, a "window of opportunity" has opened.⁸ Given the balance of strategic-nuclear forces, the Americans are unlikely to unleash their nuclear weapons except in particularly extreme circumstances, while the NATO Alliance has been thrown into disarray by the German nuclear program and by persistent rumors of broader intentions.

25. The Politburo decides to capitalize on its "window of opportunity". An ultimatum - and an offer - are to be delivered to the Germans, with the design of isolating the Germans from their American and European allies. After much debate, it is decided that an ultimatum accompanied by military saber-rattling would be counter-productive. The Russian leaders reason that NATO would respond to an ultimatum by banding together at least temporarily, even to the extent of increasing force-readiness and partial mobilization.

26. The Soviet General Staff argues that an attack against a fully alerted NATO might not succeed, especially because of the unknown effect of the NATO Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI) and the possible effect of the new-technology weapons. They argue that, by

contrast, NATO is highly vulnerable to a surprise attack, and that a plan should be developed for seizing West Germany after isolating the Germans from their European allies and from American nuclear support.

GERMANY, SELECTED GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES AND MAIN EAST TO WEST INVASION ROUTES (see numbered arrows; expl. appended)



27. The plan accepted by the Politburo calls for political and military surprise. West Germany up to the Weser River is to be seized by a coup de main. To preclude the American use of nuclear weapons, American forces are to be pinned down in their sector but not seriously attacked. To further postpone any American decision to use nuclear weapons, American forces are to be attacked in a manner confirming their own pre-conceptions, and they are to be allowed the satisfaction of confirming the validity of their tactical expectations. It is thus hoped that while the American chain of command is deluding itself with apparent success (and reporting its successes back to Washington), northern Germany can be overrun. In northern Germany, the main thrust would advance south of the U.S. brigade at Helmstedt while the programmed U.S. reinforcement brigades would not make contact. Should U.S. units appear on the sector of the offensive, they are to be pocketed and contained.

28. To isolate Germany from the European allies, the plan calls for political blandishments along with the threat that the Soviet Army would advance beyond the Weser if Germany's allies insist on cooperating with NATO. It is thus hoped that the quick defeat of the forward NORTHAG forces will make it apparent that no further defence can be militarily viable. The Soviet Union would then offer a cease-fire in place and a promise not to take advantage of it, in return for a dissolution of NATO and the neutralization of what is left of West Germany. Thus the integrity of the remaining NATO countries is not threatened, and a strategic glacis for the French and British can still be maintained.

29. The Politburo rationalizes that this plan could produce a fait accompli achievable with low casualties and with the minimum risk of a nuclear exchange. It also rationalizes that stopping at the Weser is preferable to seizing all of Germany. A united Germany, even if Communist, would be a latent threat to the U.S.S.R. By contrast, the addition of the 'Weser' territories to the GDR, would make the latter a competitive entity and a permanent counterbalance to a reduced FRG, with the difference in economic potential being compensated by superior GDR military capabilities.

30. The Politburo reasons that its window of opportunity will last for several years. Having decided on war, no overt steps are to be taken that might alarm NATO in the interim, while the USSR begins a masking or deceptive operation to prepare for the surprise attack. The three critical factors are to generate an adequate attack force, to position the forces, and to gradually increase the proportion of the Soviet SLBM fleet at sea.

31. The Naval Deception Plan: The Soviet surface fleet puts to sea for a previously announced ASW exercise. It would lack any conspicuous amphibian capability that might threaten the Norwegian coast. The ASW exercise would be terminated as announced, several days prior to the chosen attack date, and the Soviet surface fleet would leisurely return to port while using seemingly lax communication procedures to saturate and preoccupy NATO eavesdropping. In the hours prior to the attack, elements of the Kola-based SLBM fleet would turn about and help clear the Barents Sea for passage of the SLBM submarines into the Norwegian Sea. At this time, the Russians would

inform the Norwegians that they have no aggressive designs on Norway, but that they are prepared to attack if the Norwegians do not "cooperate". It is thus hoped that the SLBMs would not be vulnerable to a preemptive counterforce strike and that the SLBMs which had been in port would be underway and mostly out of the Barents Sea by the time the U.S. might consider using nuclear weapons.

32. The most difficult task is the aligning and positioning of the Soviet attack forces themselves. To preclude a loss of surprise, only part of the Soviet forces in East Germany would attack initially. Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and Hungary would not be pre-warned, though of course senior Soviet commanders and staffs would be prepared. Remaining units in the GSFG would be activated by standard alert procedures at H-hour, and ordered to proceed directly from their alert assembly areas to attack positions. Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia could not attack before D+1, but this would not be crucial. Their task - as that of the non-Soviet Pact forces - is only to pin down NATO forces in their sectors. To increase the effectiveness of this pinning-down effort, the Russians would try to create the impression that the delayed main thrust will be launched into Bavaria. This would cause NATO to hesitate about shifting elements of German II and U.S. VII corps to the north, even if Soviet pinning-down efforts prove unsuccessful. To maximize the pinning-down effort, Soviet units are to attack in single echelon as they become available. Reserves for exploiting any success are to come from the lateral shifting of forces but in general, the attacks are not to be pressed hard except to maintain the appearance of a serious offensive on those sectors.

33. The real Soviet effort will be focused on the thirteen NORTHAG divisions. The 8 and 2/3rds divisions⁹ of CENTAG's III GE and V and VII U.S. corps are to be pinned down in their sectors. These have the highest state of readiness of any NATO divisions but they are also thinly stretched in a linear deployment, and their posture is most unsuited for any riposte into the GDR. The Thuringian mountains and forests act as a further barrier against a counter-offensive into the GDR, or against the flanks of the main attack into West Germany. The five U.S. divisions and 12th Panzer division of the American corps sectors are to be pinned down with three divisions. Determined attacks are not to be pressed in the Fulda Gap, Meiningen Corridor, or the Coburg and Hof Gaps. The three Soviet divisions are to attack in single echelon for maximum impact; their secondary mission is to protect the flank of the main attack. The two in-place divisions of III GE corps are to be attacked by two divisions, with one division held back in general reserve.

Germany, Main East to West Invasion Routes

<u>Traditional Name/ Most Probable Route</u>	<u>Distance</u>	<u>Width of Route at selected points¹</u>	<u>Major Obstacles²</u>
1. "North German Plain" Helmstedt through Hannover to Duisburg (i.e. Rhein River)	355 km	(Goslar to Wolfsburg) 57 km (Steinhuder Lake to Deister Ridge in vic. Autobahn E8) 15 km	Oker River Leine River Innerste River Aue River Erse River Fuhse River Weser River Mittelland Canal Weser Gebirge Teutoburger Wald
2. "Göttingen Corridor" Vic. Göttingen through Paderborn to Duisburg (i.e. Rhein River)	255 km	(Kaufener Wald to Harz Gebirge) 40 km (Rheinhardswald to Solling Naturpark) 15 km	Leine River Weser River Rheinhardswald Solling Natur- Park Lippe River Egge Gebirge
3. "Hessian Corridor" Vic. Kassel via Autobahn E4 to Frankfurt a.M. (i.e. Main River)	215 km	(Kassel to the Ringgau) 60 km (vic. of the Wetter- au) 20 km	Werra River Kaufunger Wald Fulda River Knüll Gebirge Intermittent hills be- tween Kassel and the Wetterau
4. "Fulda Gap" Vic. Fulda Gap via Bundes- strasse 40 to Frankfurt a.M. (i.e. Main River)	120 km	(Hohe Rhön Gebirge to Vorder Rhön Geb.) 15 km	Ulster River Fulda River Vogelsberg Büdingen Wald Hessischer Spessart Geb.
5. "Meiningen Corridor"	175 km	(Hohe Rhön to the Hass Berge) 20 km (in the Spessart Gebirge) less than 5 km at points	Spessart Geb. Main River
a. Vic. border south of Meiningen via Aschaff- enburg to Rhein River in vic. Darmstadt			
b. Vic. border south of Meiningen to Würzburg (i.e. Main River)	90 km	(Hohe Rhön to the Hass Berge) 20 km (Gmünden to Schwein- furt) 40 km	Some inter- mittent hills and forests

6. "Coburg Gap"	40 km	(vic. Coburg)	Main River
a. Vic. Coburg to Bamberg		20 km	Intermittant Hills
(i.e. Main River)			
b. Vic. Coburg to Nürnberg ³	95 km	(vic. Coburg)	Main River
via Bamberg		20 km	Regnitz River
		(vic. Bamberg)	Intermittant
		vic. Erlangen)	hills and
		15 km	forests
7. "Hof Gap"	150 km	(vic. Hof)	Saale River
Vic. Hof to Nürnberg		20 km	Hilly the
via Autobahn E6			whole way
			with inter-
			mittant
			forests
8. "Cheb (Eger in German)	150 km	(vic. border	Fichtel
Gap" Vic. border west of		and numerous	Gebirge
Cheb to Nürnberg		points to Nürnberg)	Franconian
		less than 10 km	Hills
9. "Furth Gap"	220 km	(vic. border	Oberpfälzer
a. Furth im Wald to		and numerous points	Wald
Nürnberg		to Nürnberg)	Naab River
		less than 10 km	Franconian
			Hills
b. Furth im Wald to	160 km	(vic. border and	Oberpfälzer
Munich		numerous points as far	Wald
		as the Danube) less	Bayrischer
		than 10 km	Wald
			Danube River
10. "Danube Corridor"	450 km	(Inn River)	Neusiedler See
Vic. Neusiedler See on the		90 km	Enns River
Austro-Hungarian border to		(along Danube River)	Inn River
Munich via the Danube Plain		30 - 50 km	
and Salzburg			

Notes:

- Population centres are not included as obstacles, however below are listed relative samples of the density of villages with populations of less than 5000. The numbers indicate the number of villages in an area of 400 square kilometers (20 km x 20 km) astride the invasion route near the border. Populations are greatest in the North German Plain Area and least along the Czechoslovak border.

Gebirge and Berge are German words meaning roughly hill/mountain area. Wald is also a German word which means heavily forested area. All the areas mentioned in the obstacles with the term Wald are also typified by rough, hilly or mountainous, terrain.

- The distance from Nürnberg to Munich is approximately 165 km. Major obstacles are the Franconian Hills and the Altmühl, Danube, and Amper Rivers. The terrain flattens out past the Altmühl River in the vicinity of Ingolstadt.
- Relative Density of Small (less than 5000 pop.) Villages astride Invasion Routes

North German Plain	43	Meiningen	36	Furth	19
Göttingen	26	Coburg	30		
Kassel	30	Hof	28		
Fulda	28	Cheb (Eger)	21		

34. This leaves fifteen Soviet divisions (GSFG) to attack the thirteen NORTHAG and one German division from Allied Forces, North Europe (AFNORTH). However, of the NORTHAG Divisions, only nine are in Germany in peacetime. Moreover, on weekends these forces are effectively cut in half due to the pass policy of the Bundeswehr. The four divisions of I German corps are particularly vulnerable on this score as they are largely recruited from Nordrhein-Westphalien. Thus on a weekend, fifteen GSFG Divisions would effectively face only five NORTHAG/AFNORTH Divisions; of these, half are British and largely deployed behind the Weser.

35. Fifteen Soviet divisions can readily swamp and brush aside the handful of available NATO divisions. There will be confusion on the Soviet side in part due to green troops. But the confusion will be even greater for the few available NATO troops, who are also inexperienced and who will lack the attacker's mental advantage of pre-assigned tasks to contain the confusion factor.

36. It will also be possible to enhance further the Soviet force-ratio advantage by exploiting the effects of surprise, and by adding covertly, an increase to the force. The new Soviet procedure of bi-annual troop rotation entails the possibility of increasing Soviet troop strength by twenty-five percent, without NATO's immediate knowledge. This would amount in effect to an increase of five division-equivalents. If placed within the Soviet main effort, this means that twenty divisions would be mustered against the five readily available NATO divisions, in addition to an eight-battalion special operations group.

37. Instead of rotating twenty-five percent of the conscripts as normally scheduled in the GSFG, trained conscripts due for release can be "hidden" in the casernes for several days at least, while an additional twenty-five percent of trained personnel is lifted in. Some of these troops can be used to man pre-positioned equipment sets, effectively adding one or two battalions per division. But, the bulk of these additional troops should be light reconnaissance and heli-assault infantry. As it is, the GSFG has enough tank and heavy-firepower assets; and its chief problem is to ensure that the tank/mechanized formations are not stopped or bogged down, especially in the context of the many rivers, heaths, forests and the urban sprawl characteristic of the 'Weser' territories. In order to ensure that the operations of the heavy formations remain fluid, the Soviet planners will want to assist their advance with heli-borne light infantry and fast moving light recce to act as precursors. The former can also be used to induce congestion in NATO road and rail traffic and hence delay the return of individual soldiers to their units, and the movement of NATO combat units forward. Helicopter-borne assaults and special operations can also disrupt the few NATO garrisons available for duty immediately. The alert detachments of garrisons located within 100 kms of the border can be caught in their casernes; and it will be even easier to separate the tank battalions of NORTHAG from their ammunition. The latter is held in depots that are generally poorly guarded, and located five to ten kms away from the casernes.

38. The Soviet need for light infantry is quite large, and its use will be constrained by the availability of lift. Thus, for the first

several turn-arounds, Soviet planners must set strict priorities. Their first priority must be to preserve the fluidity of the main attack units. It may seem that the first Soviet priority must be to attack NATO nuclear forces (that is: storage depots; command, control and communications facilities (C³); airfields, and launch units). But most of these targets are quite deep in the FRG, and there is much redundancy. Attacking deep targets would also reduce turn-around rates and increase helicopter losses. Nuclear storage depots cannot be profitable targets: even if fully half were destroyed, NATO would still retain many more warheads than it could usefully employ in the time available. Moreover, by refraining from attacks on NATO nuclear capabilities, the Russians would dampen the pressure to escalate. Nor are C³ sites sufficiently renumerative. Most head-quarter functions are too fungible to make attacks upon them worthwhile, unless the command staffs themselves can be targeted. This will be difficult to do on a weekend, and destroying the facilities would have little impact: communication equipment can be replaced, and there is no way that NATO's use of the hardened Bundespost system can be precluded.

39. NATO airfields and most nuclear units are beyond the reach of helicopter assault teams. If the Soviet offensive does succeed in surprise, it will not be necessary to attack NATO nuclear launch-units since the Soviet units will be too fluid to target. NATO airfields are obviously highly renumerative targets but it will be difficult to do more than harass them by ground parties (e.g., mortar attacks on fuel-laden aircraft while taking off). The preliminary insertion of such parties could disclose Soviet intentions while

achieving little. NATO airfields can be attacked much more effectively by air, without any risk of a loss of surprise for the offensive as a whole.

40. The first lift of light troops will therefore be used for assaults on border-guard barracks, tank-ammunition depots, the casernes of the covering forces, and division level air-defences (as well as air-defence radars along selected corridors). If there is still capacity in the first lift, NATO casernes in the Weser territory that contain headquarters and any remaining combat units will be targeted.

41. The second lift will be used to insert ambush and engineer parties along likely NATO deployment routes. The third and subsequent lifts will be used for the direct support of the thrusting columns. The assault troops involved will have the task of facilitating the movement of the main thrust columns, by seizing or attacking critical defensive points in their path.

42. The primary mission of Soviet air forces will be (i) to provide air defence for Soviet thrust columns; (ii) to block the forward movement of NATO units billeted behind the Weser; and (iii) to provide assistance should any NATO counter-attack develop against the thrusting columns. This means that Pact air reinforcements need not be made ready for action until after H-hour. Since NATO gives so much credence to air power and to the early warning potential of its AWACS, a deliberate delay in the use of Soviet airpower will be integral to the deception plan. Soviet air forces in place will launch an air attack at H+15 minutes against NATO airbases, but

thereafter they will revert to their primary missions, until subsequent reinforcements release sorties for the general harassment of NATO rear areas, and airfields in particular.

43. NATO views Soviet forces as heavy-handed, dependent upon mass and heavy firepower support, and deployed in echelons. The five divisions deployed to attack CENTAG will conform to this preconception within the constraint of a single echelon attack. The 15 divisions and reinforcing light infantry allocated to the main thrust will by contrast attack according to the 'Manchurian' model, with an emphasis on single-echelon operations.¹⁰ Certainly, the forward divisions will attack in single echelon. To facilitate their forward movement - and maximize initial surprise - the forward divisions will initially leave behind their artillery regiment and multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battalion; nor will there be any army/front artillery attachments. Organic artillery will not rejoin their parent divisions until after the passage of the second-echelon divisions. Thus the initial assault will consist of a series of meeting engagements off the march-column mounted by battalions and regiments advancing in columns abreast behind a light recce screen. The seizure of critical transport nodes by heliborne infantry will open the way for the assault. Lead divisions will attack with all four regiments, retaining only anti-tank units in the reserve. The reserves needed to counter any threatening counter-attacks will be obtained by shifting forces from adjacent columns. Islands of unexpected resistance in the NATO array will be contained and by-passed.

44. The chief difficulty of the projected Soviet operation will be to maintain absolute secrecy while positioning the forces needed for the first echelon. The need for secrecy rules out early air reinforcements as well as any increase in the order of battle of large formations. But this does not amount to a major constraint; a sufficient number of main line formations are available in any case and the shortcoming of the peacetime structure is the lack of light infantry which is suitable for covert reinforcement. Only the arrival of the reinforcing light infantry (easily disguised) and the forward deployment of the divisions of the lead echelon entail the danger that attack preparations might be disclosed. As far as the preparations of the divisions of the lead echelon is concerned, the danger of disclosure can be minimized by routinizing single division half-yearly exercises for each of the five armies organic to the GSFG. To allay NATO suspicions, the new routine is to be accompanied by a training and organizational re-alignment of the GSFG.

45. Under such a re-alignment, the training and organization of the GSFG are to be made more symmetrical. Each army of the GSFG is to have four divisions, at four levels of readiness. Since there are four tiers (of six months each) in the manpower pipeline, the new field exercises are to peak the 3rd tier at the time of their transition to the last tier, when the old 4th tier rotates back to the USSR to terminate conscript service. At the same time, the artillery of the exercising divisions is to be conspicuously absent, being kept either at the home caserne, or else at a separate artillery range. In the envisaged operation, there is in any case only a small role for the divisional artillery.

46. In this way, a lead echelon of five heavy divisions could be positioned forward, and an attack initiated, without telltale preparation. The remaining fourteen divisions would then be activated by standard alert procedures at H-hour. This would of course result in a twelve-hour gap between the attack of the lead echelon and the arrival of the reinforcement and consolidation divisions that follow. In a normal operation, this gap would entail unacceptable risk against a defence able to employ German-style 'venting' tactics. But in the circumstances of a surprise attack upon NATO, the risk is acceptable. For if surprise has in fact been lost - and this would be readily revealed by NATO's frantic recalling of pass personnel - the operation can be postponed to a more opportune time.

Scenario Two: The Deterioration of East West Relations and the Disintegrative Effects of U.S. Decoupling: A Breakdown in Crisis Management and a Soviet Preemptive Non-Surprise Attack

47. This scenario proceeds from the course of events outlined in Scenario One, or for that matter any series of events that results in a severe crisis. In this scenario, however, the Politburo rejects the General Staff recommendation for a (delayed) surprise attack. Immediate action is required but it is noted that while a surprise attack would probably still succeed, NATO's peculiar vulnerability to special operations has been reduced by a number of simple remedial actions: a rescheduled pass policy, the precautionary up-loading of tank ammunition within NORTHAG, and a belated recognition of the importance of security units equipped with dual-purpose anti-aircraft gun vehicles.

48. In Scenario Two, the Politburo decides to initiate a limited mobilization to add credence to its demand that the FRG permit a U.N. investigation of the reported German development of nuclear weapons and ABM defences. The Germans demur, and Soviet demands for French and Dutch cooperation in pressuring the Germans are rejected by the two governments. NATO indicates resolve, increases its unit readiness, and begins to bring in some reinforcements from the U.S., UK, and Canada.

49. The declarations of leading politicians in the FRG and the US incense the Soviet leadership. They demand that NATO cease bringing in external reinforcements. The Russians declare they will reciprocate by not reinforcing their own forces. But due to lags in the reinforcement process, NATO perceives that further Soviet reinforcement is taking place, and visibly increases the rate of its own reinforcement. The Soviets issue an ultimatum which NATO rejects. The Russians then launch full-scale mobilization.

50. At this juncture, both sides have brought their active forces into a state of war readiness. The Dutch and Belgians have mobilized their active divisions and have moved them into the FRG; the British have recalled their BAOR contingents in Northern Ireland and the Americans have brought in several of their REFORGER divisions. East European mobilization is nearing completion and additional Soviet armies are moving into the GDR. But to avoid a further aggravation of the crisis, both sides have refrained from moving to their wartime deployment positions, except for screening reconnaissance units. But both the Warsaw Pact and NATO have moved their forces into assembly

areas, some of which are well forward. Portions of NATO's covering forces are also reported to be in their forward assembly areas.

51. The Soviet generals are in a quandary. They had always hoped to obtain a measure of strategic surprise, so as to permit the wide-scale use of the new third-dimension tactic of vertical assault (whose potential value for facilitating the fluidity of armored assaults NATO has underestimated while focussing on countering the tank itself with anti-tank gunships). The new tactic would now have to be used in limited fashion, for the immediate support of the thrust columns. Special operations in the depth are ruled out - losses would now be too high while little more than general harassment could be achieved, due to the change in the complexion of the targets.

52. Surprise must be redeemed by a combination of unexpected timing and location, and by the very nature of the attack. The apparent choice in timing is between an immediate attack (before NATO can occupy its defence positions) or to wait until the Pact's own preparations are complete. One group argues that the Soviet advantage in force ratios increases with time, and that the additional weighting of Pact forces with Soviet units is necessary to ensure the proper 'stiffening' of the non-Soviet formations.

53. Another group argues that these considerations, while valid, are outweighed by the uncertainty inherent in the defence potential of the new technologies. This group points out that NATO and Pact forces are structured on radically different lines. If the Pact were to attack fully prepared defences coordinated in line from the Baltic

to the Alps, it might just happen that they would be playing into NATO's hands and that the Pact's offensive would be bogged down. This group recalls that in 1914, the European powers had maintained a combined total of over 70 horse cavalry divisions for exploitation and pursuit. It was possible that academic specialists in America like the well-known MIT 'Boston Group' were right in their analysis. Certainly the U.S. Army had come to a similar conclusion, and had long practiced the concentration of its forces for 'target servicing' against the axis of a breakthrough. The conclusion reached by this group was that since there was no way of determining a priori whether the "dynamics of the modern battlefield" had again turned full circle (as in both World Wars), the Soviet Army should avoid the risk by attacking immediately, that is before the battlefield could be set. All agreed that if the battle could be kept fluid, the power of the new defensive technologies could be circumvented. The experiences of the October 1973 War were cited to support this point.

54. A third group objected that since surprise had been lost, an immediate attack would be too risky. They argued that NATO had in fact adopted a 'Plan D' -- the ill-fated French strategy in 1940 to rush into Belgium -- and should be allowed to overextend itself by implementing its own plan to the full. It was one thing to attack into the strategic depth of NATO in a surprise attack; it was quite another to attack into those depths after NATO had been fully alerted and given time to bring its units to full strength and shake them down for combat. They reminded their colleagues of Soviet experiences in the Great Patriotic War against opponents like General Man-teuffel and his Gross Deutschland Division. At this time, they argued

NATO still had in effect a mobile defence, with almost its whole force in operational reserve. They argued that NATO generals should be assumed to be clever: their senior field commander was now a noted German expert on tank warfare. Moreover NATO had excellent C³ and even if certain NATO armies were operationally phlegmatic, agile German divisions would be encountered immediately. It was foolish for the Soviets to accept such circumstances of uncertainty and to risk defeat-in-detail, when almost certainly such risks could be avoided by simply waiting a few days before initiating serious combat. Once NATO implemented its wartime deployment plan, the operational reserve would be absorbed into the linear cordon.

55. The essential elements of the plan suggested by this third group were to delay the offensive by two days to allow NATO to position itself as it wanted and to induce the aggressive American-dominated NATO air forces to blunt their edge in combat against Soviet ground air defence. Then a dual Cannae could be launched against the Covering and Main Forces of each NATO corps. In the meantime, a maximum political effort would be made to drive a wedge between the U.S./FRG/UK core of NATO and its other members, the French and Dutch in particular.

56. The timing and actions of the latter plan were outlined as follows:

- (a) H-Hour to D Day Plus 2. The Warsaw Pact declares war on NATO. But no major air or ground offensive takes place. This contradicts all NATO expectations. Soviet diplomats use the opportunity to try to detach the French, Dutch and the other

smaller countries from NATO. (For instance, the USSR could claim that war was only declared to give greater credence to its attempt to stop German nuclear rearmament as well as American reinforcements.) Soviet diplomats could claim that the Warsaw Pact has no territorial demands on any NATO countries and that it would refrain from attacking Norway and Denmark, provided they respond to its initiative by separating themselves from NATO's war preparations. The Warsaw Pact announces that only non-Soviet divisions have attacked across the NATO front, and that none would proceed more than 10 km beyond the pre-war demarcation line, pending further negotiations. During this period, non-Soviet Pact divisions are given the dual task of pushing back the NATO screening force and of pinning down the NATO covering forces (estimated by D+2 to amount to a third of total NATO forces). This task is to be conducted as a single echelon attack, for which ten non-Soviet divisions are allocated.

The Soviet priority at this point is to erode the strength of the powerful NATO air forces on which NATO had lavished such great resources in a vain attempt to offset ground-force deficiencies. NATO air forces are to be enticed into launching interdiction attacks into the GDR. Since Soviet forces will be held in wooded and urban assembly areas, losses to NATO air attack will be minimal while the NATO air forces, attacking strong and coordinated air defences, will suffer heavy losses. If the NATO air forces can be misled into thinking they are causing much damage, the Pact should be able to shoot down or

damage a significant proportion of NATO's ground-attack aircraft, thereby greatly weakening Alliance air forces for the next phase of the war when Pact ground forces will truly be vulnerable to air attack. (In addition, by seeming to be "escalatory", a NATO air-interdiction campaign will yield the political bonus of being divisive.)

Pact air forces will not attack the NATO airfields at this stage, except to the limited extent that might be needed to goad NATO into retaliation, and to underscore Pact concern over the incoming U.S. reinforcements. Such restraint will tend to enhance the Pact's political standing. Besides, once surprise is lost, NATO aircraft will be largely sheltered and scarcely vulnerable. Accordingly, it is desirable at this stage to shoot down NATO aircraft rather than suppress sorties by runway attack. The Pact will also use the two days to move forward its air-defence umbrella and the (conventional) artillery by another 10 kms, in preparation for the next stage.

- (b) D Day Plus 2 to D-Day Plus 3. By D+2, NATO's Covering Forces, and roughly half the NATO Main Forces, should be in position.

From D+2, Pact air forces are to concentrate on air defence, the ground support of erupting Pact tank columns, and on large-scale attacks upon NATO air bases. In the latter case the aim will be to suppress NATO's sortie-generation capability, mainly by attacking NATO runways with new concrete cluster munitions. High-performance aircraft in the NATO inventories should be particularly vulnerable to this tactic more

so than the British Harriers or German Alpha-Jets which can shift their operations to local roads. The capability of Alpha Jets, however, is too limited to inflict significant damage on Pact forces.

Pact air forces will not dissipate their effort by targeting C³, LOC, or reputed nuclear storage and launch sites. None of these targets is renumerative at this stage. The nuclear sites will most likely be empty, and launchers will be too dispersed. NATO forces are now mostly in place with enough supplies for the immediate battle. If Pact air forces can suppress NATO air sorties, and Pact ground forces can grip NATO Covering Forces and in-place Main Forces, NATO commanders will in either case have little chance to influence the battle, except by using nuclear weapons. The Russians will seek to neutralize the nuclear weapons by their political stance and by not pressing the attack after the encirclement of the NATO main forces. Hence NATO C³ centers will have little to control in any case; it will therefore be better to leave these centers open so that NATO forces will seem less threatened to NATO political leaders, and their 'rational' decisions against the use of nuclear weapons can be made and transmitted downward.

On the ground, non-Soviet forces are to launch an immediate vertical- and ground-envelopment of the pinned-down NATO Covering Forces. For this mission, all Polish, Czech, and GDR airborne units and a further ten Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP)

divisions will be used. It is imperative that the NATO Covering Forces be encircled, and not just pushed back. Where suitable forests or gaps for passing the helicopters into the rear of the thinly-stretched Covering Forces are not available, forward forces will wedge gaps under the cover of heavy suppressive fires from in-place artillery. The first helicopter wave will focus on setting up roadblocks to cut lines of retreat and the second wave will bring in infantry, to ensure that NATO Covering Forces in retreat do not break out through forests.

Meanwhile Pact forces on the ground will attempt to prevent the withdrawal of NATO Covering Forces while they are being enveloped. The Pact forces will then attempt to split the NATO Covering Forces into numerous small pockets, while opening as many roads as possible for the advancing Soviet formations.

- (c) D-Day Plus Two to D-Day Plus Five. Soviet forces pass through NSWP formations as open routes of advance become available. Their initial main effort will be on the same axis as the enveloping NSWP units. As these roll out, Soviet formations continue forward. Their movement is to be facilitated by heli-assault infantry attached to tank-heavy advance guard formations. Recce and advanced guard sub-units are to probe aggressively forward, developing combat situations for the rapid deployment of the main probes. In the interim, secondary probes will be pushed forward across the front, as routes

through the NSWP formations become available. These can become main efforts later, if others fail, by opportunistic reinforcement. It is envisaged that one or more of these aggressive probes will be successful in each NATO corps sector; these probes are to form the basis of the Cannae pincers.

Successful probes will immediately be reinforced from division, adjacent-unit, and Army echelons. Unsuccessful probes will be allowed to wither. Their task will be to hold the NATO forces opposite in place, while releasing any spare sub-units to adjacent probes that are successful.

- (d) D-Day Plus Five to D-Day Plus Eight. The NATO Main Forces are encircled. Relief forces hastily organized from units moving forward to their General Deployment Positions are thrown back and now occupy (isolated) blocking positions. A cease fire is offered.

57. Under this plan the Soviet attack would thus appear in the aggregate as a series of parallel probes, some being advanced, and others 'refused'. The overall effect will be to pin down NATO forces where they are, while a fraction of the Pact force finds gaps in the NATO array. Some gaps are bound to open because only half of the NATO main defence forces will be on-line; and in some cases (e.g., in the U.S. corps) it is the encircled Covering Force units that were to have helped occupy front-line defensive sectors. Nor can there be significant reserves available to plug holes or counter successful penetrations, since NATO division/corps reserves are almost entirely to be formed from the Covering Force. Even if many gaps appear, the

Soviet army will exploit only a few.

58. Successful probes will be reinforced from division and army OMGs into "expanding torrents" as in the normal Soviet practice. But in a major departure from the formal doctrine, the Soviet army will not exploit penetration into NATO's strategic depth. Instead, successful penetrations will immediately be "rolled out" to encircle the defending NATO formations. Soviet forces will not attempt to launch their much-advertised 100 km-per-day offensive marches. There will be no need to do so because the bulk of NATO's formations will have been encircled and defeated quite near the front line. There are no further NATO defences to be pre-empted nor any NATO operational reserves capable of reversing the operational success of the Soviet army. Accordingly, there is no military necessity for a further advance. NATO military and political authorities will in any case be painfully aware that the war has been lost. By refraining from advancing further, the Pact victory will be made to seem not so menacing after all. Soviet 'moderation' can then be exploited politically.

59. In such conditions, the American President will be reluctant to use nuclear weapons. Events have moved so fast, and forces on the ground are now so interspersed that his only recourse would be to use strategic or quasi-strategic nuclear weapons. But most important is the apparent restraint of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, in the American military strategy there are certain implicit phase lines, which if crossed will trigger predetermined reactions. By not crossing these lines, the Soviet Union can confuse the issue. The Ameri-

cans are thus much less likely to trigger an "irrational" nuclear war. Similarly, by not threatening the implicit 'glacis' lines of the French and so on, the Soviet Union will make it easier for these countries to come to terms.

60. The dominant group in the Soviet General Staff thus concluded that NATO's forces could be defeated in detail, and bagged, near the line of demarcation. Events would unfold too fast for French ground-force participation. In the structure of the Soviet plan, 20 NSWP divisions should be able to defeat, or at least prevent the withdrawal, of the roughly ten division-equivalents of the NATO Covering Forces. Soviet forces will by this time total at least forty divisions. These will fall on the ten plus NATO divisions of the partially deployed Main Forces then in the process of arriving and entrenching themselves in their new battle positions. In a few days, NATO will have lost more than half its total forces, while Soviet forces will then be well positioned to strike deeper against the remaining fifteen divisions of NATO, six of which are French.

Scenario Three: A Spreading International Crisis: A Full Mobilization Attack

61. Pro-Communist elements seize power in Iran. Kurdish leftists, with the support of the new Marxist regime, seek to incorporate the Kurdish lands of Turkey into an autonomous Kurdistan within the new Iran. They infiltrate men and weapons into Turkey. After protesting to no avail, and receiving no support from its NATO Allies, Turkey retaliates with a limited incursion into Iran. The USSR protests and threatens. The U.S. now feels compelled to give oral support to its Turkish ally. A border war begins between Turkey and Iran.

62. To strengthen its hand, the USSR induces Bulgaria to reassert its latent irredentist claim to a part of Turkish Thrace. It becomes known that Greece, while still ostensibly a NATO member, has made secret overtures to Sofia. Turkey now demands the overt and uncompromising support of NATO. The ACE Mobile Force is committed to Thrace. The USSR protests while Bulgaria launches a limited attack into Thrace, in order to establish a claim to "its legitimate boundaries".

63. The Warsaw Pact mobilizes in-place to support Bulgaria. NATO is thus compelled to mobilize in-place also. To symbolize its commitment, the U.S. ostentatiously sends the dual-based brigades to Europe. The USSR protests REFORGER as an unnecessary provocation and sends its SLBM fleet to sea. U.S. strategic forces are put on alert; SAC bomber wings are dispersed.

64. The Soviet Army begins a limited reinforcement of GSFG. To preclude further U.S. reinforcements of NATO Europe, the Iranian Marx-

ists are induced to reassert Iran's latent claims in the Persian Gulf, over Bahrein in the first instance. They assert that the Shah's regime was illegal and therefore had no legal capacity to renounce any part of their Persian heritage. The Saudis demand U.S. support and the 82d airborne division is sent to the Persian Gulf, establishing positions in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein.

65. The Russians protest again. The GSFG is reinforced with ten tank/MR divisions and the bulk of Soviet air-assault formations is deployed in Poland. NATO moves to general deployment positions. USSR decides to eliminate once and for all the danger of German militarism, to remove the destabilizing American presence, and to establish a safe and peaceful Europe.

66. In surveying the military situation, the Soviet General Staff concludes that the opportunity for surprise has been lost; that it is not possible to defeat the functional components of the NATO corps piecemeal or to launch a successful pre-emptive attack. NATO forces are now on-line and well entrenched. The only countervailing Soviet advantage is that the USSR has been able to reinforce fully, while the U.S. has only sent limited reinforcements to Europe because its lift has been tied up for the dispersal of SAC, and for the airlifts to Thrace and the Persian Gulf.

67. With NATO forces now well-entrenched, the Soviet General Staff see little merit in probing for gaps in the NATO line, and they will partially revert to former practices. The NATO line must be broken through and the NATO wings forcefully separated, for an eventual defeat-in-detail and the ultimate collapse of the overall defence.

NATO's escalatory nuclear threat is to be countered by making the most of the USSR's well-known superiority in "Eurostrategic" weapons, and its perceived advantages in the strategic-nuclear balance. The USSR will also attempt to fragment the NATO Alliance with various blandishments; but in this case these are not expected to be particularly fruitful.

68. For the offensive, the Soviet High Command Stavka musters 35 Pact and 41 Soviet tank/MR divisions, as well as ten division-equivalents of airborne and air assault infantry. NATO, including the still uncommitted French forces, has a total of 33 divisions plus a number of German territorial formations of undetermined value. It can be assumed that the lack of time, and Soviet air activity, will preclude further reinforcements from the USA.

69. The Stavka decides to launch the offensive along the 80 km Eisenach/Muhlhausen/Ellrich sector. Twenty-three Soviet and two GDR divisions, as well as the bulk of the available helicopter-borne and light infantry will be concentrated against this sector facing the two weakest Corps in NATO: III German and I Belgian, totalling only 4-2/3 divisions. The first British, first German, and first Dutch Corps as well as the AF-NORTH sector are to be attacked, pinned down and contained by the 13 Polish and two Soviet divisions of the Northern Group of forces. As a precautionary measure, a four-division Soviet Tank Army is to be assembled behind this Front, backed up by an additional Combined Arms Army from the USSR available from D+5. Its mission will be to defend against any excursions of I GE Corps into the GDR, and to attack on the flank and rear any large-scale

movement of German and British forces to the south.

70. U.S. forces are to be attacked, pinned down and contained primarily by GDR formations stiffened with Soviet divisions. U.S. VIIth Corps and 12th Panzer are to be checked by a Soviet army composed of two GDR and two Soviet divisions, while U.S. V Corps is to be confronted by a Soviet Combined Arms Army of one Soviet and two GDR divisions. In addition, the flank and rear of VII the U.S. Corps are to be threatened by supporting attacks launched from the Cheb and Furth Gaps by ten Czech and five Soviet divisions. This attack will also serve to counterflank any NATO counter-offensive up the Hof Gap. Finally, the far flank of II GE Corps will be threatened by the six Hungarian and four Soviet division of the Southern Group of Forces. Allied forces in Berlin obviously pose no threat, and will easily be contained by the available forces in place. In the unlikely event of a breakout or attack against the circumvallating rail lines that pass around Berlin, reinforcements arriving from the Western military districts of the USSR will be detailed to remove the threat.

71. The Eisenach/Ellrich axis extending northwest to Paderborn, then west to the Ruhr, can be considered to present nearly optimal conditions for a deliberate, large-scale attack launched without the benefit of surprise:

- (a) NATO is attacked at its weakest link - the juncture of its two army groups and, coincidentally, of its two weakest Corps. The troops of III German Corps are of high quality but the forces in the sector total only two divisions and one airborne brigade. The Belgian formations are of uncertain quality.

Two of their six brigades will not be combat ready, being composed of recalled reservists who have never before trained together. Of the four active BE brigades, the Flemish battalions are understrength insofar as regulars are concerned, being topped off for the sake of appearances with conscripts serving only eight months. The Belgian Covering Force of three recce battalions is equipped with modern light armoured fighting vehicles fully capable of stripping away Soviet light recce; but these forces are not capable of coping with Soviet advanced guard formations that contain main battle tanks (MBT's).

- (b) The main attack can be launched from a salient in the NATO frontage. The road network to the west and northwest is excellent, and it offers the shortest distance to the industrial heart of the FRG. At the same time, the road net leads to diverse possible objectives and thus offers excellent possibilities for confusing the NATO command and also to outflank the adjacent British and American corps. It is known that the British feel exposed in their NATO-imposed forward defence positions, while the Americans will most likely be mesmerized by any threat to Frankfurt and the Rhine crossings.
- (c) The Eisenach/Ellrich/Paderborn corridor also offers the best protection for the exposed flanks of the Soviet offense as the action proceeds. The NATO command has rationalized that this area with its vast forests and broken terrain is easy to defend; the converse of the proposition is that the area is

also easy to defend once seized. At first, the flanks of the thrust will be covered by the Thuringian and Harz obstacles. The flanks that become exposed as the attack unfolds are also readily defended. And, most important, the NATO forces best able to counterattack Soviet flanks - i.e., elements of I GE Corps - are remote. A counterattack mounted from elements of I GE Corps would have to cross major obstacles such as the Mittelland Kanal, British lines of communication and the Teutoburger Wald before making contact. With Soviet air forces alert against this possibility, it is unlikely that such a counterattack can be mounted in a timely manner. If the NATO should attempt it nevertheless, the Stavka can count on a Tank Army positioned to strike against the flank and rear of such a move, and this also offers the possibility of establishing a second main thrust to exploit any opportunities in that direction.

Nor is a serious counterattack from the South at all likely. The Americans will be fully occupied in placing their units in front of the Soviet tank army moving down the Hessian Corridor. Even if the Americans adopt their new tactical doctrine and become more counterattack-minded, the lay of the roadnet will work to their disadvantage while offering major counterflanking opportunities from the Soviet Combined Arms Army attacking frontally in that sector.

- (d) With NATO forces fully deployed and with the consequent loss of surprise, the corridor chosen is the only large one remain-

ing where the new third-dimension tactic of vertical assault can be used to any extent. In the other sectors, the deployment of effective low-level air defence and the relative openness of the terrain constrain their use. In this sector on the other hand, the widespread forests provide overflight routes; it is to be recognized that losses will be heavy and that strong groups of gunships and fixed-wing escorts will be necessary. Nevertheless, helicopter losses will be more than compensated by the increased tempo of ground operations, and it is this above all that will make it difficult for NATO to react in a timely manner.

- (e) Finally, a vigorous exploitation of the opportunities offered by the corridor could lead to a rapid collapse of the NATO Front. Conditions are favourable for driving a major wedge between the NATO wings with two corps (albeit small ones) that can be smashed while the integrity of another two (I Br and V U.S.) can be threatened in an action of only two or three days. This means that French forces cannot intervene in a sufficiently timely manner. As for any shift of forces from NORTHAG, this might actually hasten a general collapse. Conditions can thus be set for a negotiated settlement: NATO forces will still possibly be largely intact but they will be severely unbalanced and greatly disadvantaged, while considerable territory will have been lost by NATO. Alternatively, a continuation of the offensive will be generally recognized as leading to a general collapse within a matter of days (leaving NATO with even less bargaining power - except for the scarcely

credible threat of American nuclear reprisals).

72. For Pact air forces, the main task will be to support the main offensive. This will primarily take the form of air defence, to ensure freedom of movement on the ground. The highest priority in the allocation of attack aircraft will be given to the escort of vertical-assaults and to oppose any NATO counterattacks, particularly against the exposed flanks of the main thrust. The balance of available attack aircraft will be allocated to NATO air bases, in support of the air defence mission. Since for all intents and purposes the war should be over within a week, the purpose of attacks against NATO airbases will be to suppress sorties. The primary mission will be runway cratering with the new cluster munitions. Pact aircraft will not be used to attack hangerettes, fuel dumps, etc. at NATO airbases. Nor will aircraft be diverted from their primary mission, to attack nuclear storage or launch facilities, C³ centers, or NATO LOCs. Their primary target will be runways.

73. The scheduling of the Soviet plan will be as follows:

- (a) H-Hour. Ground forces attack across the front. All holding attacks will be in single-echelon formation. In secondary sectors, successful probes will not be vigorously pursued. It is the desire of the Stavka that these opposing enemy forces remain where they are. There will be two main thrusts. The lesser will be launched from the Cheb and Furth Gaps, with the aim of rolling up the flanks of VII U.S. Corps. If II GE Corps remains forward, it is to be enveloped. If II GE Corps withdraws, it will be pursued no further than the Ulm/Wurzburg

line, to avoid disturbing on-going negotiations with the French.

In the major attack corridor, NATO Covering Forces will be encountered within the first several kilometers after crossing the Demarcation Line. Pact advanced guard forces will wedge themselves immediately into the Covering Force, with the heavy suppressive fire support available from pre-located artillery and MRL concentrations. Helicopter assault formations will immediately follow the wedging actions, rolling out to cut off the lines of retreat of the NATO Covering Forces and to facilitate the rapid advance of the Pact wedging forces towards the main defensive line.

At this stage, Pact air forces will provide air defence and ground support for the attacking forces, with a clear priority of effort going to the main axes. Any residual aircraft will stand-by for attacks against NATO air bases for the purpose of suppressing sorties as NATO mounts its interdiction air offensive. At this point in the battle, Pact forces would not be seriously threatened by NATO aircraft: most Pact units will still be in their sheltered assembly areas, all units will be protected by the coordinated air-defence umbrella, and NATO commanders will as yet be unsure of the axis of the main attack. Moreover, the NATO air forces (to the extent USAF view has become the standardized doctrine of its centralized air command) will be occupied with attempts to destroy Pact air bases and air-defence units rather than ground forces.

Such aggressiveness will only serve to blunt NATO's air power. But the three main reasons for the delay in attacking NATO air bases are (a) that no possibility of surprise exists, (b) to facilitate the passage of Pact aircraft through a NATO air defence system which has become saturated with its own aircraft and (c) to be able to crater NATO runways after most of their aircraft have left base, thus causing severe recovery problems that will inhibit NATO's subsequent sortie-generation. The Stavka recognizes that Pact air forces will suffer from the same effects, but ground attack capabilities are much more important for NATO because of its need to offset deficiencies in the ground defence.

- (b) D+1/2 - D+1. The Pact's main thrust approaches NATO's main defence positions. These NATO positions are to be attacked immediately, to take advantage of any surprise or shock arising from the unexpected collapse (or capture) of the Covering Forces. Pact light-armored and motorcycle recce units will begin probing on the flanks of the march columns to look for by-pass routes (i.e., to implement the so-called "expanding torrent" system of attack). If neither an immediate surprise breakthrough nor the bypassing of strongpoints works, Pact artillery/MRL concentrations will be ordered to move forward over the necessary 10-20 kilometers, to support more deliberate attacks.
- (c) D+1 - D+2. The main thrust penetrates NATO's defensive line. Forward NATO forces, now lacking the operational reserves that

were to be provided by the returned Covering Forces, are enveloped by ground pincers and vertical assaults. NATO's defences in the sector now collapse.

- (d) D+2. At this stage Soviet exploitation forces meet only token resistance, largely from isolated territorial formations. Two Tank Armies (reinforced with light infantry) are positioned on flanks adjacent to U.S. and British Corps, to safeguard the flank of main Pact thrust. The Pact's main force drives its thrust to Paderborn. In the vanguard (to facilitate the movement of the main body) is the newly-formed East German Fraternal Socialist Army, composed of one Soviet and two GDR divisions as well as reinforcing light-infantry units.
- (e) D+3. Highway 480, the Brilon-Paderborn line, is now breached. NATO initiates a limited nuclear strike (shot-across-bow). The Soviet Union pointedly announces that it will not reply in kind and now offers a conditional cease-fire in place. In the meantime the Pact advance continues.
- (f) D+3-1/2. NATO accepts Soviet cease-fire terms which essentially call for the dissolution of NATO and the ceding of the Weser territories to the GDR.
- (g) D+4. Cease Fire. Lead Pact formations are now approaching autobahn line E3 on the outskirts of the Ruhr metropolis. Holland and Belgium withdraw from NATO, declare neutrality, and deny their facilities to NATO.

Scenario Four: A Limited Attack Against an Isolated NATO Component (i.e.) The U.S. Is Isolated and Expelled From Europe

74. A coup in Columbia establishes a pro-Soviet regime. Expatriates claim that there is Cuban involvement in the coup. American newspapers display pictures proving a Cuban military presence in Columbia and public pressure builds for an American display of firmness. The new Colombian government asks for Venezuelan solidarity against Yankee imperialism; it calls for an oil embargo against the U.S. The U.S. sends an airborne brigade and a Marine regiment to Columbia and re-establishes the 'legitimate' pre-coup government.

75. An active guerilla movement begins, with unambiguous Cuban participation. A U.S. (Joint) Corps of three reinforced divisions is unable to re-establish the Colombian government's authority over the whole national territory. U.S. tactics, with their heavy reliance on air and artillery bombardment, are unsuccessful and the effects of such bombardment are widely displayed on world television. U.S. casualties mount. Both the public and the Administration become polarized. In an effort to reconcile opposing views, an air and naval blockade of Cuba is instituted in the hope of suppressing the conflict while avoiding more U.S. casualties.

76. European editorials ponder the failure of American armed intervention, and doubt the wisdom of the blockade of Cuba. Meanwhile the blockade outrages the Soviet Union; its leaders call for a special meeting of the UN General Assembly. The Assembly resolves that the U.S. blockade violates international law, and it condemns the U.S. Most NATO allies abstain from the vote. The U.S. is now outraged at the Europeans for their lack of support. The U.S. initiates a

massive Human Rights campaign aimed at the Soviet Union and the East European governments. The Soviet Union is again outraged. The Russians contend that their internal security is not a matter to be taken lightly, and that it will not be allowed to become hostage to American military and political problems elsewhere. European editorials question the wisdom of an alliance system dominated by the U.S., and the possibility that their countries could be dragged into a conflict which is not of their doing. The U.S. is increasingly seen as erratic, irresponsible, and ineffectual.

77. The Politburo senses an opportunity. Past Soviet attempts to split the NATO alliance have been unsuccessful or even counter-productive but now the U.S. has inadvertently driven a wedge between itself and its European allies. In the past, the Politburo could feel that the American presence was conducive to stability in Europe, but recent American Administrations have seemed distinctly more erratic. Their policy of stationing long-range nuclear weapons in Germany, and the Human Rights campaign have resulted in serious threats to the Soviet state. If the U.S. is becoming a destabilizing factor, the time has come to eliminate the U.S. presence. Success would insure the Soviet Union's military and political domination of the Eurasian continent.

78. The Politburo considers a military plan for seizing the U.S. garrison in Berlin. This, it was argued, could be done by a surprise coup de main, a bloodless move in the middle of the night. But such a move would accomplish little militarily, and it could backfire politically. Instead, it is argued that the U.S. must be humbled mili-

tarily: U.S. forces in Europe must be defeated, and preferably in a manner that would serve to discredit the U.S. military presence still further. The Soviet General Staff is tasked to work out the details of the plan, with the instruction that the plan must minimize the risk that nuclear weapons will be used.

79. The Soviet General Staff reports that after reviewing U.S. Corps dispositions and their apparent doctrine as espoused in FM 100-5, it is possible to administer the Americans a severe lesson, within the constraints set by the Politburo. But the Soviet military leaders emphasize that the operation will be very risky, unless the political leadership can ensure by diplomacy that the remainder of NATO's formations (and in particular the German component) would be neutralized. The General Staff would position forces to protect against any FRG incursions into the GDR because they are still worried that by attacking the Americans, the flanks of their offensive will become vulnerable to counter-attacks from adjacent German units. (It is not for nothing, they surmise, that the Germans had sandwiched a German divisional sector between the two U.S. Corps, in addition to the German Corp sectors adjacent to the American.)

80. The neutralization of the German army by diplomacy was in their view critical because the overall strategic context implied that the Soviet army would neither have the advantage of surprise nor that of overwhelming force, since the potential of their superior mobilization system could not be fully exploited. The General Staff noted that if the Germans were not neutralized, Pact forces would then be outnumbered (in manpower) until reinforcements from Poland and the

Western USSR Military Districts could be brought forward. The Soviet General Staff recognized the merits of the tradeoff under which no more forces would be brought forward for fear of alarming the Germans. It was also important to highlight this danger to the Soviet political authorities.

81. The Soviet military plan called for allocating two Tank Armies of four divisions each to attack the two U.S. Corps frontally. Two additional armies of seven Soviet and two GDR divisions were to guard against possible NATO counter-attacks in the North German Plain. The threat of Pact forces in Czechoslovakia and in the Danube Corridor from Hungary would suffice to protect the far left flank of the Soviet offensive from any II German Corps counterattack or incursion up the Hof Gap towards Leipzig or Karl-Marx-Stadt. Another two armies of five Soviet and four GDR divisions centered at Muhlhausen and Erfurth would protect the right flank of the offensive against possible III GE Corps reactions (including action from the sandwiched 12th Panzer Division). These forces would also act as apparent (diversionary) second echelon armies, while being ready to launch a main attack on the Eisenach-Paderborn axis, should the Germans intervene.

82. The Soviet plan called for the capture or destruction of the combat elements of the two American Corps by D+3. If the plan did not succeed, the operation could still be terminated by D+3, and the operation could be declared a success, since it would be apparent that the Soviet effort was quite limited, involving less than half of the GSFG and only a limited use of its tactical airpower. Moreover,

the USSR would gain some bargaining power from its possession of some strips of FRG border territory.

83. But in fact, the possibility of failure was considered small and the USSR could fully expect to be negotiating from a position of strength by D+3. At that time, however, the Soviet forces sent into action would be in disarray, and vulnerable to flanking attacks from the adjacent German units. It was therefore essential that the political authorities limit their diplomatic demands to the Americans, while acting in every way to allay FRG anxieties.

84. Soviet air forces would limit their activities to the provision of air defence in the GDR's air space as well as air defence and ground support for Soviet forces attacking the American corps sectors. Their zone of operation will not extend beyond 50 kms from the Demarcation Line, with special permission being required for any deeper sorties. Soviet aircraft will in any case refrain from attacking any German urban areas. The General Staff fully appreciates the objections of the Soviet Air Force to these constraints. But political necessity rules out deeper attacks (particularly against air bases). And given the circumstances existing, it would in any case be very difficult to achieve Soviet air superiority or even to suppress U.S. Air Force sorties to a significant degree. In the air the primary effort will therefore be focused on neutralizing the ground-attack capabilities of the U.S. Air Force. As for Soviet ground attack efforts, these will focus on counter-mobility and defence suppression (in particular against low-level gun air defences) to facilitate helicopter operations. Moreover, since

Soviet forces will make no deep thrusts into the depth of NATO, Soviet ground forces will nearly always remain under the air-defence umbrella, and will not therefore be especially vulnerable to USAF air attacks.

85. It is the Soviet interpretation of American force dispositions (from intelligence sources and from the study of American tactical doctrine) that makes them believe that the Americans still subscribe to an attrition theory of warfare and put great faith in the defensive firepower potential of new-technology weapons. To maximize this potential, the American doctrine of AirLand Battle calls for locating its combat elements well forward in the Covering Force and Main Battle areas, thus leaving little combat strength in reserve within the division and corps. Reserves are to be generated by bringing in relatively uncommitted units from the flanks and then lacing them in front of suspected thrust vectors. In the American view, time is to be gained for these movements by good intelligence and by establishing 'decision points' in front of the main U.S. battle positions. Their tactical ideal is to focus physical destruction upon the lead and immediate flanks of Soviet thrust vectors. The Soviet ideal is just the opposite - to bypass and envelop any positions of concentrated strength.

86. It is clear that the American corps forces are peculiarly vulnerable to envelopment. When an opening occurs (fortuitous, forced, or from working around), Soviet forces can quickly funnel through vertical envelopment and armored units into the American rear. Because of their tactics and organization, the Americans will

have few if any operational reserves with which to oppose the rapid Soviet exploitation of tactical opportunities. Pact heli-assault actions will be facilitated by the American neglect of low-level air defences for their forward units. American AA gun weapons are mostly obsolete and too few in number, and they have not provided a back-up in the form of heavy machine guns mounted on logistic vehicles.

87. As stated by a general considered a leading expert in doctrinal matters, the American operational concept is:

- (a) see deep to find the following echelon,
- (b) move fast to concentrate forces,
- (c) strike quickly to attack before the enemy can break the defence, and
- (d) finish the fight quickly, before the second echelon closes;
- (e) all this while using the defenders' natural advantage - terrain to multiply the strength of the defence.

88. The Russian operational method of "Flexible Reinforcement" will serve to confound the Americans, should they actually follow their declared doctrine. First, there will be no deep echelons against which the defence can be focused, since the axis of the main Soviet attack will be contingent. Therefore there can be no a priori discernment or decision points for guiding the defending forces into place. The American commander will be confused from the start of the unfolding operation. To add to his confusion, deception will be employed in the depths of the Thuringian Wald in the form of a false

second echelon. Lead probes against each U.S. corps sector will reinforce the deception by emanating from this subsector. To lend further credibility to the deception plan, Soviet air forces and long-range artillery will make moderate efforts to prevent the lateral concentration of the U.S. defence. After the attack begins to unfold, Soviet airpower and artillery will devote their primary effort to prevent the redeployment of this concentration. Events permitting, the Russians will also unleash several 'daring thrusts' to help prevent U.S. redeployments. So much for the first element of the American doctrine.

89. The American command will move rapidly to concentrate its forces (point (ii)). Accordingly, the American command may be allowed to 'bag' its own forces, facilitating subsequent Soviet encircling operations and simplifying the task of the Soviet forces. The American commander could also attempt to "strike quickly" against the lead Soviet probe before it breaks the defence (point (iii)). But in so doing, the Americans will be concentrating their forces against a mere diversion. By not pressing this diversion, the Russians can ensure that the American command will also become frustrated by its inability to "finish the fight quickly" before the second echelon arrives (point (iv) of the U.S. concept). It will also be noted that this in itself presumes the existence of a second echelon in a fixed form that does not exist in the contemplated Soviet operational methods (OM). Thus the American time schedule is incorrectly geared, and the Russians can begin their envelopment action before this is recognized.

90. Finally, it will be noted that the American concept of "terrain advantage" violates the Clausewitzian precept on the proper use of terrain for defence. The Americans are in danger of falling prey to the classic error which Clausewitz warned against: the use of terrain to magnify local (micro-defensive) effects instead of viewing terrain in the (macro) framework of a larger system, designed to dislocate the attacker, compartmentalize his forces and make counterattack possible at an opportune moment. (That, of course, is the tactic that makes the Germans so dangerous.)

91. The Soviet plan calls for a quick opening in the American Covering Force and Main Battle positions. This rules out a standard Soviet-style mass attack. Too much time would be lost in bringing up the artillery, and such a loss of time would defeat the deceptive effort, eventually allowing American sensors and automatic data-processing to defeat Soviet disinformation. Besides the roadnet behind the Soviet front in the Thuringian Wald does not favour a normal 2d echelon attack. The lines of communication are limited and readily blocked, making it difficult to funnel large forces into predesignated channels. On the other hand, the GDR has an excellent lateral roadnet forward of the Thuringen Mountains. The roadnet favours the Flexible Reinforcement OM which calls for multiple probing attacks and the lateral shift of reserves to exploit successful probes.

92. If the Soviet deception plan works and the Americans follow their doctrine, the Americans will bag themselves. In doing so, they will thin out their line elsewhere, thus facilitating a quick Soviet

breakout. The Soviet deception plan fits American preconceptions very well and this will greatly simplify the Soviet action.

93. The critical task is to penetrate the American Main Battle positions before the U.S. concentrations can be shifted back. The Soviet deception plan, Soviet tactical air power, and, most of all, the vigor in which their probes are pushed and reinforced will contribute to this task. If they are successful in this task, the Soviet army will overcome the great uncertainty that haunts all armies before a conflict. Specifically, the American focus on attritive firepower will have proven to be irrelevant, even if it were to be shown that the American command had been more correct than the Soviet in analyzing the theoretical strength of the new-technology weapons. The analogous situation is that of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914. If the envisaged tempo of the operation can be established, the Americans will be defeated regardless of the fact that their defence may indeed dominate the offense in the subsequent experience of warfare.

94. If the deception plan fails, and the Americans do not concentrate their forces, there is the possibility that the assumptions underlying the American tactic of 'target servicing' could prove correct. On the other hand, this tactic is just another manifestation of the long-standing American preference for firepower, the previous manifestation now being recognized as deficient. The AirLand Battle Defence doctrine of the Americans is not based on any truly new insight or revelation and should not give cause for anxiety. Moreover, even if defence has indeed become the dominant form of warfare once again, by virtue of enhanced new-technology firepower, the

Americans have in fact compromised the viability of their defence since they have put too much of their strength forward. This phenomenon is most pronounced in the VIIth Corps sector. Specifically, the American dispositions are vulnerable to the well-known German tactics of 'die Lucken and Flachentaktik' (the tactics of space and gap). This vulnerability is inherent in all aspects of the American dispositions - tactically by their focus upon avenues of approach and operationally because of the manner by which the Americans stretch their forces in linear fashion across a wide frontage, and also by the fact that American Covering Forces have been reinforced to become true fighting forces even while the Americans do not have enough units on-line, nor an operational reserve. In the American case, covering force elements must also serve as components of the Main Battle position (after being pulled back) and form the entire operational reserve. Thus, the loss of the CF compromises the American defence structure as a whole. And if the Main Battle positions are vulnerable to Soviet "space and gap" tactics, a fortiori it follows that a fighting CF which uses Active Defence tactics must be even more vulnerable. Tactically, the Americans are vulnerable because of the way in which they disperse their forces. American forces are allocated in fairly rigid fashion to terrain avenues of approach, and they are sized by "comparing the available space with known Soviet attack zones of action." The terrain between avenues of approach or "space available for maneuver" is considered 'disruptive terrain' and is generally neglected, being only lightly - if at all - patrolled and outposted. Furthermore, the American infantry has in fact become a heavy anti-tank guided missile force, and is no longer

well suited to guard forest expanses. This may be an acceptable practice in their own country; but in Germany the forests are not real barriers and American forces can therefore be readily flanked, by Soviet armor advancing on the many excellent logging tracks or doroga¹¹ and by heli-borne light infantry moving overhead.

95. In the forthcoming operation, NATO forces can be expected to be in or near their General Deployment Positions. In the V and VII U.S. Corps sectors, these positions (in line with the NATO concept of Forward Defence) are only 20-30 kms from the Demarcation Line. In many cases, initial U.S. Covering Force locations are well within the range of pre-positioned Soviet artillery, a phenomenon most pronounced in the Vth Corps sector. The Soviet plan will therefore probably unfold as follows:

- (a) D-Day Minus One. Formations will move into forward assembly areas. A cover-and-deception plan is used to mask their true size. Uncommitted Soviet and GDR formations are to move into simulated 2d echelon positions with the apparent intent to support main thrusts along the Spahl/Fulda and Lindenau/Bamberg axes against V and VII Corps respectively. Front and army artillery concentrates into the Spahl and Lindenau salients.
- (b) H-hour. Soviet probing attacks are launched across the full width of V and VII U.S. Corps sectors. Artillery and tactical air support are concentrated in support of the simulated main thrust emanating from the Spahl and Lindenau salients.

- (c) H+2 - 3. Soviet advanced guard detachments of the "main" probe are halted by the stiffening resistance of the American armored-cavalry screen and the Covering Force.
- (d) H+3 - 5. The main body of the Soviet force approaches. 'Secondary' probing attacks push back the U.S. cavalry screen. Lead Soviet elements engage, and begin the working around process.
- (e) H+4. Under heavy suppressive fire support, the lead Soviet probe envelops U.S. Covering Force strongpoints. Soviet heli-borne infantry and armor columns roll-out in order to block the line of retreat of remaining U.S. Covering Force elements. Other Soviet probes contain and bypass U.S. Covering Force elements. The Soviet air force and Operational Maneuver Groups are tasked to prevent the defence from devolving from its concentration.
- (f) H+8 - 9. Soviet probes approach U.S. Main Battle positions to seek immediate penetrations with the forces at hand. Motorcycle recce units begin their infiltration through adjacent forests.
- (g) H+11. The Soviet penetration is established and locally reinforced.
- (h) H+11-1/2. Soviet heli-borne units begin the rollout and envelopment of U.S. Main Battle positions.

- (i) H+12. Major Soviet ground reinforcements arrive to begin the rollout and envelopment action. U.S. forces are locally encircled, and prevented from establishing additional battle positions. The Americans find that Soviet forces are too interspersed with their own and that the situation is too chaotic for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
- (j) D+2. The V and VII U.S. Corps are enveloped and pocketed.
- (k) D+3. Cease-fire. To secure the return of its hostages, the U.S. agrees to remove its forces from the European continent. The world is shocked to find that the American Army collapsed so easily; it appears that the victorious Soviet forces were outnumbered by the two American Corps. The Russians attribute their victory to American decadence. Europe is Finlandized.

CONCLUSIONS

96. The four scenarios presented above cover the full spectrum of possibilities: a Pact surprise attack, a pre-emptive non-surprise offensive, a full-mobilization offensive and a Soviet offensive deliberately limited in scope to the two U.S. Corps sectors.

97. No loaded assumptions, no all-encompassing strategems, no imaginative new tactics, nor any new weapons were posited. At both the political and military levels the scenarios are straightforward.

98. The fundamental deficiency of NATO that emerges in all four cases is its operational passivity at both the theater-strategic and

the operational levels. It is this passivity that exposes NATO's wings and components to defeat-in-detail; that allows the Russians to concentrate their efforts, and to obtain one-sided advantages in their dispositions - tactically and operationally. It will be recalled that it was the operational passivity of the inter-war French Army (driven by the desire to implement the firepower lessons of Verdun) that constrained the French political leadership and that eventually permitted Nazi Germany to isolate and destroy the East European allies of France, thus discrediting the usefulness of Anglo-French guarantees. Finally, at the tactical and operational level, it was this passivity that greatly contributed to the French Army's collapse on the battlefield itself.

99. So long as NATO's operational passivity continues - under the aegis of the mistaken notion that defence and offence are separate and distinct¹² - the usefulness of many of NATO's specific measures to enhance deterrence during periods of increased tension, to improve crisis-management capabilities, and to reinforce from North America will be undercut. In some cases, such measures could become counter-productive. Reinforcement in and of itself does not reduce passivity; in a crisis period it is militarily useful only in the sense that the aggressor is forced to devote marginally more assets to secondary sectors, perhaps weakening his main action somewhat. At the same time, reinforcement could induce Soviet pre-emption.

100. Ultimately, the side that accepts operational passivity will have no adequate defence. All therefore must depend on deterrence - and deterrence is only as good as the strategic-nuclear balance.

APPENDIX I

"THE WINDOW OF NECESSITY" THESIS (OUTLINE SUMMARY)

The familiar "window of opportunity" argument focuses on the projected trends in U.S. and Soviet strategic-nuclear capabilities. But a full-scale strategical analysis suggests that we are faced with: (i) a period of Soviet military advantage whose nature is altogether broader; and (ii) with a Soviet Union whose leaders will not just have the opportunity to act, but who will be under a great compulsion to act (in order to convert a temporary military advantage into a permanent benefit for the nation).

The reasoning is as follows:

During the period 1968-1975, the United States failed to invest in the growth of its military forces as a result of the Indochina war first, and of the resulting budget-cutting thereafter.

Concurrently, during the 1966-1977 period, the PRC failed to invest in the growth of its military forces because of the ascendancy of the anti-PLA/pro-militia "Gang of Four" leadership.

Concurrently, NATO and non-NATO Western Europe failed to maintain an adequate level of investment, for both party-political and socio-economic reasons.

Concurrently, the Soviet Union invested steadily in the growth of its forces.

This perverse coincidence now shapes, and will for some years continue to shape, the world-wide and multi-force (not just U.S.-Soviet only, or strategic-nuclear only) military balance. Given the time lag between investment and maturation, the effect of the combined U.S.-European-PRC effort gap, vis-à-vis Soviet steadiness, did not emerge until recently, and it will continue to intensify over the near-to-medium term.

1. If the U.S., Western Europe and the PRC had simply continued to under-invest through the later seventies and beyond, then the 1980s would have been an open-ended period of relatively increasing Soviet military power.
2. In that case, all would no doubt have been under great pressure to (competitively) seek a political accommodation with Moscow. But, on the other hand, they would have virtually been assured of peace during the 1980s, since the Soviet Union could then have looked forward to the achievement of a decisive military advantage over the U.S. and Western Europe and the PRC during the 1990s. Thus peace could have been assured during the 1980s, albeit at the expense of a certain Soviet political domination in the 1990s.
3. However, this was not to be. Again by coincidence, or at least largely for unrelated reasons, the U.S. began to invest in net growth after 1975, the PRC began to invest (on a modest but increasing scale) in 1977, while Western European efforts have increased more substantially still, in a process that began rather earlier.

4. As a result, instead of an open-ended period of increasing Soviet military advantage, the Soviet Union is now faced with a temporary "window" of advantage that will close by the later 1980s. Then the present U.S./West European/PRC efforts will substantially mature and the first SDI deployments will begin.
5. The fact that the Soviet Union could use force relatively advantageously during that "window" period, does not in itself mean that it will, and still less that it must do so.
6. Unfortunately, yet another perverse coincidence intervenes. It so happens that the time period in which the "window" of generic military advantage will close, coincides with the projected advent of the Soviet Union's economic, resource, and demographic problems. These problems will make it virtually impossible for the Soviet Union to prevent a closing of the "window" by a yet greater sacrifice of civil welfare for military strength.
7. This means that Chairman M. Gorbachev eventually will be confronted by a classic squeeze between military optimism and national pessimism. Without military optimism, there can be no deliberate decision to start a war. Without pessimism about the ability of the nation to sustain its strength into the future, there is no incentive to start a war.
8. Even so, there can be no war unless military planners can construct plausible scenarios in which the transitory Soviet military advantage can be exploited to secure a permanent enhancement of the nation's position in the world. Unfortunately, genuinely

promising scenarios like the ones listed in this paper do exist. Notably, without the use of nuclear weapons, the USSR can hope to change the PRC's map decisively by seizing Sinkiang* (and/or Inner Mongolia) while concurrently using (non-nuclear) strategic air power to reduce the PRC's industrial capacity back to 1949 levels. Alternatively, there are the various Persian Gulf scenarios.

9. By contrast, action in Europe remains most unlikely, so long as there is an untidy agglomeration of nuclear weapons with locks that can be picked. Direct strategic-nuclear action against the U.S. will not be acceptable to political leaders under virtually any circumstances.
10. Insofar as Soviet political leaders are concerned, there will thus be a window not of opportunity but of necessity. Their tendency will be to delay and avoid taking the great step. Certainly the Russians have never been enthusiastic war-initiators, their long career of expansionism resulting usually from defensive reactions, which pushed beyond the initial boundaries of conflict. But never in the past has a Russian leadership had such reason to be pessimistic, as unsolvable industrial problems emerge along with the old and intractable agricultural problems, severe resource problems, and fundamentally insoluble demographic problems (the Turkic/Slav population trends). War could gain for the Soviet Union the structural protection of a Sinkiang made into an "independent" client-state (and home for emigrating Soviet Turks), and/or a cushion of additional saleable resources.

Certainly, Soviet military planners will make quite sure that the political leadership fully realizes that as far as the future of the Russian people is concerned, they will soon be in a classic "now or never" situation. That is how wars start among great powers.

FOOTNOTES

1. As quoted in James Cable, Britain's Naval Future (London: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 15-16.
2. "Supposedly" orders of battle (OB's) have historically been misleading due to the difficulty of estimating the value of reserve formations. Thus, in the relative OBs, the West counts Soviet and Eastern European reserve formations as divisions, but not its own. A Soviet planner, however, (knowing that the Germans in the past have repeatedly fielded considerably more divisions than their OBs indicated) might believe otherwise. Specifically, Soviet planners have no way of knowing the true military value of the West German Territorial Army: in particular, whether its forces are good enough to release the twelve German divisions from sector responsibilities for counter-thrust offensive operations into the GDR itself. Unprogrammed threats to Pact rear services, and the volatility of GDR formations in the presence of an apparently victorious Bundeswehr, amount to major uncertainties that have the potential of disrupting a Pact offensive in its totality. West German reserve formations are now beginning to be grouped into brigades and equipped with armor and there is a growing recognition (particularly in the Bundeswehr) that infantry can complement, and release, armored forces.
3. For a discussion of these modes, see S. Canby and E. Luttwak, Operational Methods in Armored Warfare: Declared, Revealed, and Imputed (Potomac, Md.: C & L Associates, November, 1979). The Belgian and Dutch Corps (not covered in the study) imitate the British and German models respectively.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 453-454.
5. Ibid.
6. P. A. Petersen, Soviet Airpower and the Pursuit of New Military Options, 3 Studies in Communist Affairs, USAF, 53-57.
7. Ibid., p. 9.
8. See Appendix I: "The Soviet Window of Necessity".
9. 'Division' and 'division equivalent' are used interchangeably.
10. For an excellent discussion on the Soviet use of echelons, see D. H. Vigor, "Soviet Army Wave Attack Philosophy: The Single-Echelon Option," International Defense Review, No. 1, 1979, pp. 43-46. For a more general discussion of the Manchurian model, see J. Despres et al., Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy, Rand Corp., July 1976.

11. In considering how a Soviet officer might see his manoeuvre options, it is most important to realise that from his point of view, virtually any track is just as good an axis of advance as a metalled road. Less than 10% of the Soviet domestic road network is metalled, and the Soviet officer does most of his training on dirt tracks. (In this context, note that the Russian word doroga, which is usually translated by Western linguists as "road" actually means a track of some sort.) It is along these side ways which many Western tank drivers would shy from, that the Russians are accustomed to taking even logistic vehicles, and it is surely these tracks that a Soviet officer would use in preference to tarmac roads for carrying out his manoeuvre. (C. N. Donnelly, "Soviet Tactics for Overcoming NATO Anti-Tank Defenses," 7 International Defense Review (1979), 1099-1106.
 12. The fact that Germans themselves are not convinced of this can be seen by their handling of the defense in HDv 100-100, a position generally masked by a declaratory posture of rigid forward defense designed to highlight (ex-ante) deterrence. (Führung im Gefech, Bonn, September 1973.)
- * Not for annexation but to create a new client-state similar to Outer Mongolia. This would shift the PRC eastward by 1,000 kms.

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ABSTRACT

NATO is not sui generis. Its roots trace to an informal Western alliance that dates from the early 1900's. The geographic, political, economic, cultural, and ethnic ties that bind the countries of the northern Atlantic are ineluctable. Accordingly, the Alliance is unlikely to disappear or disintegrate. Part I of this study analyses the historic antecedents of NATO. Part II postulates four possible military threats that confront the alliance in Europe today: a surprise attack; a pre-emptive non-surprise attack; a full-mobilization offensive; and a limited attack against an isolated NATO component.

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